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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2001, members of a Dutch non-for-profit organiza-
tion called Women on Waves,1 set sail for Ireland in what they
intended to be the world's first floating abortion clinic. 2 This
venture, which was the brainchild of Dutch physician Rebecca
Gomperts, brought the Irish abortion debate back into interna-
tional headlines. 3 Dr. Gomperts, a seasoned activist, 4 was moti-
1 See generally Women on Waves at http://www.womenonwaves.org (last vis-
ited Oct. 11, 2002). See also Women on Waves Ireland (Women on Waves' partner
organization in Ireland) at http://www.womenonwaves.net/irelandindex.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2002).
2 See generally Jennifer Askin, Abortion Controversy Takes to the Seas, ABC
NEWS, Apr. 20, 2001, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/netherlands
010420_abort.html; Charles Trueheart, Doctor Plans Offshore Abortions; Ship
Would Anchor Outside Territory Where Procedure is Illegal, THE WASH. POST, June
16, 2000, at A20.
3 See Alissa Quart, Newsmaker: Rebecca Gomperts, MSMAGAZINE.COM, May
11, 2000, http://www.msmagazine.com/news/uswirestory.asp?id=6129; Leslie Ber-
ger, Doctor-Plans Off-Shore Clinic for Abortions, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 2000, at F7;
Sarah Corbett, The Pro-Choice Extremist, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 26, 2001, § 6
at 22.
4 Dr. Gomperts previously was a resident doctor aboard Greenpeace's Rain-
bow Warrior boat, which was sunk by the French government in 1991 after chal-
lenging France's nuclear interests. After leaving Greenpeace, Dr. Gomperts
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vated by what she regarded as "the 'medical calamity' [of] 20
million abortions worldwide annually resulting in the deaths of
70,000 women." 5
The idea was to "buy a ship and sail it around the world,
providing abortions at sea for women who could not otherwise
get them."6 The Women on Waves agenda was to target coun-
tries where abortion is either illegal or highly restricted and
transport women into international waters, on a Dutch-regis-
tered ship, where first trimester abortions would be offered. 7
The organization believed that it would not be subject to Irish
law because the ship would be flying the Dutch flag, and Dutch
law, which permits abortion on demand after a five-day waiting
period, would apply. Therefore, abortions performed in interna-
tional waters would place the otherwise illegal activity beyond
the jurisdictional reach of nations where abortion is unlawful.8
"served as an abortion provider in the Netherlands, and visited clinics worldwide."
Quart, supra note 3. Dr. Gomperts' activism was inspired by these travels: "[i]n
Panama she met a teen who had become a sex worker to support her child [and
Gomperts stated] that this encounter 'would have been enough to make an activist
out of most sensitive women."' Id. See also Heleen Van Geest, Dutch 'Abortion
Ship' Sets Sail to Offer Treatment for Irish Women, REUTERS (London), June 12,
2001, at 12.
5 'Abortion Ship' Arrives In Ireland, To Fury Of Pro-Lifers, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, June 14, 2001. See also Corbett, supra note 3.
6 Corbett, supra note 3. Although this comment is limited to a discussion of
whether Ireland could enjoin its nationals from traveling into international waters
to procure an abortion, it should be noted that it is far from clear whether domestic
abortion laws could not reach into international waters. "Whether international
waters are considered outside domestic abortion laws varies from country to coun-
try, says University of Richmond law professor John Paul Jones, an expert in com-
parative constitutional law." Katarzyna Lyson, Abortion At Sea, A Dutch Doctor
Aims To Launch A Floating Clinic To Help Women End Unwanted Pregnancies
Offshore, Out Of Reach Of Their Countries' Laws, MOJO WiPE, June 23, 2000,
at http://www.motherjones.com/news wire/sea-change.html. See infra, note 34 for
various bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction that might apply to Women on Waves.
7 See Corbett, supra note 3. See also Van Geest, supra note 4.
8 See Peter Ford, Banned on Land, But Free at Sea? CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR,
June 23, 2000, http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/06/23/pls3.htm. Dr. Gom-
perts explained how she expected Women on Waves to work:
[The Aurora] will initially visit ports to offer counselling, contraceptive
advice and other health services. When enough women have requested
abortions, the ship will sail 12 miles out into international waters where
the operations will be carried out in a day. As many as 20 abortions could
be carried out daily, and the clinic could operate five days a week. Only
women up to 12 weeks pregnant will be treated. The clinic will also train
local people in abortion practice. The doctor said she had taken legal ad-
vice and was confident that, as the surgery would be carried out in inter-
2002]
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Under international media attention, Women on Waves
sailed its vessel, named the Aurora (otherwise known as Sea
Change), to Ireland.9 This nation was ripe testing ground for
the maiden voyage as it constitutionally 10 and criminally'1 pro-
national waters under the Dutch flag and in a Dutch-registered boat, the
law of the Netherlands would prevail.
Jacqui Thornton, Doctor's Floating Clinic to Offer Abortions Offshore, SUNDAY TEL-
EGRAPH (U.K.), June 11, 2000, reprinted in, 27 WOMEN'S INT'L NETWORK NEWS 23
(Winter 2001). Engaging in otherwise illegal activity in international waters is not
a novel concept in itself, as evidenced in the United States by casino boats that
operate in international waters off the coastline of certain states. For discussions
of gambling in international waters off the coast of the United States, see generally
Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy, 64 Miss
L.J. 291 (1995); Robert M. Jarvis, Case Note, GAMBLING SHIPS: The Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 Does Not Extend the Territorial Sea of
the United States for Purposes of the Gambling Ship Act; United States v. One Big
Six Wheel, 987 F. Supp. 169, 1998 AMC 934 (E.D.N.Y 1997), 29 J. MAR. L. & COM.
449 (1998).
9 See generally Berger, supra, note 3; Kitty Holland & Isabel Conway, Abor-
tion Ship Unlikely to Face Legal Trouble, THE IRISH TIMES, June 11, 2001, at 3;
Claire Regan, Abortion Ship Visit to Belfast 'Off Schedule', BELFAST TELEGRAPH,
June 1, 2001; Isabel Conway, Dutch Team Faces Jail if Abortions Go Ahead, THE
IRISH TIMES, June 13, 2001, at 8; Van Geest, supra note 4; Marlise Simons, Dutch
Ship Offers Abortions; To Make Ireland Its First Call, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2001,
at A9; Chris Weinkoft, The Abortion Boat, THE HUMAN LIFE REVIEW, Jan. 1, 2001;
Ford, supra note 8; Abortion Ship in Stormy Waters, BBC NEWS, June 14, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1389000/1389271.stm.
10 In a referendum held on September 7, 1983, the people of Ireland voted for
the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution, which became Article 40.3.3. and
reads:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn, and with due re-
gard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that
right.
Art. 40.3.3., Constitution of Ireland, 1937, available at http://193.178.1.117/upload/
publications/297.pdf. See generally JAMES KINGSTON, ANTHONY WHELAN & IVANA
BACIK, ABORTION AND THE LAW 5 (1997).
11 Ireland's criminal provision on abortion reads:
Every woman being with child who, with intent to procure her own mis-
carriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other nox-
ious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means
whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether
or not she be with child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be
taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use
any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be
guilt of felony, and on being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in
penal servitude for life.
Offences Against the Person Act, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, § 58 (1861)(Ir.). This Act
was carried over from English law and remains in force today. "When Ireland sep-
arated from England in 1921 and became a free State, they drafted their own Con-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/6
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hibits abortion. Additional factors making Ireland an attractive
site include its geographic proximity to Amsterdam, the exis-
tence of an organized Irish abortion rights community and an
April 2001 national poll stating that 79 percent of Irish respon-
dents agreed that abortion should be allowed in certain
circumstances. 12
Ireland's history of abortion law has evolved through a se-
ries of constitutional amendments and case law, the latter of
which has created great uncertainty and confusion, which will
be established in the pages ahead. Abortion law in Ireland is
further complicated by Ireland's membership in the European
Community ("EC"),13 which obligates it to recognize the
supremacy of EC law when a conflict between Irish and EC law
arises. 14 Ireland and the courts of the EC have, to date, care-
fully avoided a direct confrontation between EC law and Article
40.3.3., Ireland's constitutional provision on abortion.1 5 That
said, any abortion debate in Ireland must be analyzed in light of
Ireland's obligations as an EC member. It is a thesis of this
stitution, providing that all laws previously in force would remain in frill force so
long as consistent with the 1937 Constitution or until amended or replaced by the
Irish Parliment [sic]." Seth S. Stoffregen, Comment, Abortion and the Freedom to
Travel in the European Economic Community: A Perspective on Attorney General v.
X, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 543, 556 (1993).
12 See Corbett, supra note 3.
13 Ireland became a member of the European Community [hereinafter EC] on
January 1, 1973. See Mark L. Jones, Regional Economic Organizations: Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), 2 BAsIc Docs.
INT'L ECON. L. 3 (1994).
14 The supremacy of EC law:
is confirmed by [Alrticle 189 [currently Article 249], whereby a regulation
'shall be binding' and 'directly applicable in all Member States.' This pro-
vision, which is subject to no reservation, would be quite meaningless if a
State could unilaterally nullify its effects by means of a legislative mea-
sure which could prevail over Community law.
Donald A. MacLean, Note, Can the EC Kill the Irish Unborn?: An Investigation of
the European Community's Ability to Impinge on the Moral Sovereignty of Member
States, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 527, 538 (1999).
15 See id. at 528.
The avoidance of conflict has allowed Catholic morality to remain a domi-
nant factor in State abortion law. While some may view this domination
as religious fanaticism contrary to the philosophies of personal autonomy
and equal rights for women, it is actually a unique example of a conflict
being faced by all EC Member States who may be forced to relinquish
control of domestic moral issues due to the conveyance of competences, or
powers, to a supranational organization.
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comment that Women on Waves, in conjunction with Women on
Waves Ireland (its Irish partner organization) 16 were attempt-
ing to generate a test case to force the courts of the EC to di-
rectly confront the incompatibility between Irish abortion law
and EC law.
Women on Waves failed to accomplish its mission in Ire-
land because it neglected to procure the proper Dutch abortion
licensing prior to sailing. 17 Even though the fundamental goal
of establishing the legality of offshore abortion was thwarted by
Dr. Gomperts' own government declaring her proposed activity
illegal,' 8 the arrival of the Aurora in Ireland resurrected 19 the
politically and emotionally charged question of Ireland's juris-
diction over abortion tourism.20 The venture "thrust the [Irish
abortion] issue back into the frontline of public debate,"21 which
was an additional goal of Women on Waves. 22
16 See About Women on Waves in Ireland, at http://www.womenonwaves.net
ireland/news/about.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2002). See infra note 132 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the potential legal effect of the partnership be-
tween Women on Waves and Women on Waves Ireland.
17 See Corbett, supra note 3. See also Karen Birchard, Abortion Boat Faces
Legal Complications, THE LANCET (U.K.), June 23, 2001.
18 See Corbett, supra note 3. The Aurora was limited to dockside tours of the
facility, which included contraceptive, abortion and sexual education. See Brian
Lavery, Ship Planning to Offer Abortions Makes Waves, but Hits Shoal, at Irish
Port, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2001, § 1, at 4.
19 Ireland, in 1992 was directly faced with the issue of abortion tourism and
travel in the much publicized X Case. See infra note 88 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the X Case.
20 Abortion tourism has been defined as "interstate travel for the purpose of
abortion." Gerald Neuman, Extraterritorial Regulation of Abortion: Conflict of
Constitutions? No Thanks: A Response to Professors Brilmayer and Kreimer, 91
MICH. L. REV. 939, 942 (1993).
21 Abortion Ship in Stormy Waters, supra note 9.
22 Joan van Kampen, a spokeswomen for the ship stated, "[wihat we are really
here for is to get attention for the state Irish women are in." Susan Wills, Ship of
Fools, NATIONAL REVIEW, June 26, 2001. It is interesting to note that even before
the Dutch licensing problems were publicly announced, both the Irish authorities
and anti-abortion activists were relatively low-key concerning Women on Waves'
impending visit to Ireland. "While the Aurora's voyage has made news beyond
Irish shores, reaction among pro-life campaigners in Ireland has been mostly
muted. Many feel that by keeping quiet they will starve the mission of publicity."
Abortion Ship in Stormy Waters, supra note 9. On the other hand, not all countries
remained silent regarding state action if targeted by Women on Waves. "On the
Mediterranean island of Malta, where abortions are illegal, Social Policy Minister
Lawrence Gonzi said in a recent radio interview that criminal action would be
taken against anyone organizing or helping to arrange the services that Dr.
Gomperts will offer." Ford, supra note 8.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/6
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In the summer of 2002, it was reported that Women on
Waves was preparing to set sail again - this time with Dutch
approval for distribution of RU486 23 ("the abortion pill").24 The
Dutch Health Ministry's approval for the distribution of the
abortion pill came after Women on Waves appealed its Febru-
ary 2002 denial of a license to provide first trimester surgical
abortions in international waters. 25 The Ministry of Health up-
held the denial of the surgical abortion license finding that the
organization's proposed activities abroad made it impossible for
it to meet two essential requirements under Dutch law: (1)
maintaining a contract with a nearby hospital and (2) availing
itself to unannounced and continuous health inspections.26 The
political complications, that would have arisen had the Dutch
authorities licensed surgical abortions, beg the question of
whether limiting Women on Waves to distribution of RU486
was an attempted political compromise. Alternatively, this lim-
itation might signal the Ministry of Health's acknowledgment
of the obvious risks associated with performing surgical abor-
tion on the rough seas.27
Rumors that the ship will dock off Malta on its maiden trip provoked outrage and
indignation among doctors, clerics and government officials on the island, where
380,000 people live on 122 square miles of rock and the state religion is Roman
Catholicism. The leading Catholic bishops on the island issued a statement
describing the plan as a 'monstrosity.' Lawrence Gonzi, who is deputy prime min-
ister and social policy minister, called the idea 'horrendous.' 'Such a move tries to
defy the laws of the country and the values of the society being targeted,' Gonzi's
spokesman, Alan Camilleri, said '[w]e are ready to prosecute any person that col-
ludes or collaborates with the doctor.'
Trueheart, supra note 2.
23 "Mifepristone [RU486] is a drug that blocks a hormone called progesterone
that is needed for pregnancy to continue. Mifepristone, when used together with
another medicine called misoprostol, is used to end an early pregnancy (49 days or
less since your last menstrual period began)." U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION, CENTER FOR DRUG EvALuATION AND RESEARCH, MIFEPRISTONE QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS, Sept. 28, 2000, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/mifepristone/
mifepristone-qa.htm.
24 See Dutch Officially Approve Floating Abortuary, LIFESITE (Amsterdam),
July 2, 2002; Geraldine Coughlan, Legal Boost for Dutch Abortion Ship, BBC
NEWS, July 2, 2002; Press Release, Women on Waves Foundation, Women on
Waves Can Sail Again (July 1, 2002), at http://ww.womenonwaves.org/press/
e-pressrelease.html; Dutch Officially Approve Floating Abortion Clinic, CATHOLIC
WORLD NEWS (Amsterdam), July 3, 2002.
25 See Press Release, Women on Waves Can Sail Again, supra note 24.
26 See id.
27 Indeed Dr. Gomperts stated in response to the Ministry of Health's ruling:
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In a news report dated July 2, 2002, Dr. Gomperts stated
that Women on Waves planned to set sail within six months
28
and it is expected that its destination will again be Ireland.
29
Although distribution of the "morning after pill" is permitted in
Ireland as a contraceptive, to date RU486 remains unavaila-
ble.30 As the Dutch Ministry of Health's ruling only alters the
method of abortion, any future visit to Ireland by Women on
Waves would apparently involve the same jurisdictional issues
and political sensitivities as its original mission.
If the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") were to find abor-
tions in international waters permissible under EC law, all
Member States could potentially be affected. Such a finding
could create a new "international waters marketplace," aimed
at providing services that are otherwise illegal and beyond the
jurisdictional reach of nations where these services are unlaw-
ful. Considering that all Women on Waves needed to succeed in
its 2001 venture was a Dutch abortion license to provide this
proposed service on a ship, it is not too great a stretch to imag-
[T]he Appeals Commission is being stricter with Women on Waves [than]
the law requires. The contract that Women on Waves signed with a
Dutch hospital fulfils the same requirements that apply to all other Dutch
abortion clinics. Furthermore the Appeals Commission has not taken into
account recent medical developments. According to Women on Waves,
first trimester abortions can be provided very safely at sea. A medical
expertise report, signed by more than 100 doctors, gynecologists, other ex-
perts and two marine doctors and submitted to the commission, has fully
endorsed this conclusion. The distance to a hospital is therefore totally
irrelevant when providing first trimester abortions. As regards the sec-
ond reason for denying the license, the Appeals Commission claims that
the Health Inspection cannot supervise the activities of Women on Waves
since continuous and unannounced inspections would not be possible.
This however is not a regulation stipulated by the law. By using this ar-
gument the Appeals Commission has failed to apply the law properly.
Furthermore, as a seagoing nation, the Dutch government has never had
any problems enforcing all kinds of laws on ships registered under its flag.
Moreover in the past 20 years there have never been any unannounced
inspections of Dutch abortion clinics or other institutes. Nevertheless Wo-
men on Waves has offered to establish certain provisions that would make
continuous inspections possible. Here too the judgment of the Appeals
Commission has been far too strict.
Press Release, Women on Waves Can Sail Again, supra note 24.
28 See Andrew Osborn, Dutch License Floating Abortion Clinic, THE GuARDLAN
(U.K.), July 2, 2002.
29 See Coughlan, supra note 24.
30 See Alison O'Connor, Board Approves Use of Morning After Pill, THE IRISH
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/6
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ine other Member States licensing medical services which raise
equally volatile moral issues such as euthanasia, organ dona-
tion, the transplantation of fetal tissue, or reproductive
medicine. 31
Because each Member State has its own moral parameters
and corresponding laws protecting these interests, conflicts be-
tween these laws are inevitable. By provoking such a conflict,
Women on Waves raises the broader issue addressed in this
comment: what latitude of response is the ECJ going to provide
Member States that legitimately and proportionately react to
perceived threats to their moral sovereignty?32
This comment does not argue against liberalization of Irish
abortion law, but rather advocates against the tactic Women on
Waves is choosing to advance its goals. The fact that the near-
future expansion of the EC includes countries that restrict or
ban abortion makes this discussion all the more timely. ECJ
review of any case arising from the activities of Women on
Waves will illustrate a conflict that may be faced by all EC
31 1 am indebted to Michael Zachary, Adjunct Professor at Pace University
School of Law for the euthanasia hypothetical.
32 This comment certainly does not suggest that violations of peremptory
norms of international law may be shielded from EC court review merely through
the labeling of a Member State's activity as a moral issue. Abortion restriction
and/or abortion prohibition have not reached the level of a violation of a preemp-
tory norm.
The October 19, 2002, Irish Referendum on the Treaty of Nice signals that the EU
is about to undergo an extensive expansion. See Mark Brennock & Denis
Staunton, Yes Vote Clears Way For 10 States to Join EU, THE IRISH TIMES, Oct. 21,
2002, at 1; Alan Cowell, Irish Vote for a Wider Union, and Europe Celebrates, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002 , at A3. If these countries are formally approved, Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Cy-
prus and Malta will join the EU in 2004. See Brennock & Staunton, supra. Seven
of these ten EU applicant countries "have significant Catholic populations and re-
striction or bans om [sic] abortion such as Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Malta." Marcin Frydrych, Abortion Not Consid-
ered In Enlargement Talks, EU OBSERVER.COM, Dec. 28, 2001, at http://www.
euobserver.comindex.phtml?selected topic=15&action=view&article id=4646.
Presumably, the "EU applicant countries that wish to maintain anti-abortion mea-
sures in their national Constitutions or laws on becoming members of the EU, will
need to negotiate special provisions to that effect in their individual Accession
Treaties, [similar to Ireland's Protocol No.17 to the Maastricht Treaty]." Id. If
these countries become Member States, the potential exists for a wide variety
of abortion restriction claims to reach the ECJ. The future will have to show
whether the probable accession of these states will impact the ECJ's abortion
jurisprudence.
2002]
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Member States that "may be forced to relinquish control of do-
mestic moral issues due to the conveyance of competences, or
powers, to a supranational organization."33
While this is a broad issue with potentially enormous con-
sequences, this comment will confine itself to the issue of
whether enjoining Irish nationals from obtaining abortions in
international waters would be a permissive derogation from EC
law. 34 This comment suggests that if Ireland enjoined its na-
tionals from obtaining abortions in international waters, such
action, if brought before the ECJ, should be viewed as a permis-
sive derogation from EC law under the public policy exception of
Articles 46 and 55 of the EC Treaty. Although the ECJ may
inevitably be forced to directly confront the incompatibility be-
tween Irish and EC law, the historical, political and religious
underpinnings of Irish abortion law dictate that great judicial
restraint should be exercised in this regard. This comment con-
cludes that the ECJ should not permit the clever activism of
Women on Waves to be the vehicle by which the court confronts
and decides a legal issue of such social and political magnitude.
Such a finding would be antithetical to the EC's underlying
33 MacLean, supra note 14, at 528.
34 It is acknowledged that with the passage of the Travel Amendment serious
questions exist as to whether the Irish Courts would issue a travel injunction in
the first instance. See infra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Travel Amendment. This comment will not address the possibility of Ireland ob-
taining extra-territorial jurisdiction over its nationals once in international wa-
ters. Although, it should be noted that presumably Ireland could assert such
jurisdiction. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 402 CMT. 5 (1987) (taking the position that "while states 'gen-
erally exercise jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality,' they 'may apply at least
some laws to a person outside [state] territory on the basis that he is a citizen').
[The Restatement] acknowledges, however, that such cases 'have generally in-
volved acts or omissions that also had effect within the state.'" Seth F. Kreimer,
The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, The Right to Travel, and Extrater-
ritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 476 n.82
(1992). Under the prescriptive jurisdiction of nationality, "[a] state has jurisdic-
tion to prescribe rules of law (a) attaching legal consequences to conduct of its
nationals wherever the conduct occurs; or (b) relating to a thing, status or other
interest of its nationals wherever the thing is located or the status or the other
interest is localized." ROSALYN HIGGINS, The Legal Bases of Jurisdiction, in ExTRA-
TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO 6 (1984) (citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
(1965)). Further Ireland could assert extra-territorial jurisdiction under the "Ef-
fects Doctrine," the premise of which states that a nation may obtain jurisdiction
over extra-territorial acts that have an effect on their nation. See id. at 7.
[Vol. 14:385
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principle of recognizing diverse moral and cultural traditions
while fostering common agreement on economic and other is-
sues. The Irish abortion debate is an area of nationalistic moral
sovereignty and, as such, liberalization of this law should be left
to the Irish people.
II. OVERVIEW OF IRISH ABORTION LAW
A. Abortion and the Irish Constitution Prior to the 1983
Amendment
The Irish Constitution (Bunreacht na hEireann)35 was
adopted in 1937 and was written by Eamon de Valera at "a time
when Catholic identity was critical to the Irish State and the
Irish people in the wake of their independence from Protestant
Great Britain."36 The Catholic influence was so engrained in
this document 37 that even before 1983, when there was no ex-
press prohibition of abortion in the Constitution, many scholars
believed that the Constitution inherently protected the right to
life of the unborn.38 This belief was based on "the assumption
35 See Department of the Taoiseach, Translation of Irish Terms at http://www.
taoiseach.gov.ie/general/translations.asp?lang=ENG&loc=283 (last visited Oct. 12,
2002).
36 Amy M. Buckley, The Primacy of Democracy Over Natural Law in Irish
Abortion Law: An Examination of the C Case, 9 DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 275, 278
(1998). Eamon de Valera (1882 - 1975) "was a leader of Ireland's struggle for inde-
pendence from Britain (1916-1921), and of the Republican opposition in the ensu-
ing Irish Civil War, and was subsequently thrice Irish Prime Minister and later
President." WIKIPEDIA, at http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon De Valera (last
visited Dec. 2, 2002).
37 "The Preamble to the Constitution, as well as sections of Articles 40 and 41,
exalt God as the ultimate lawgiver and clearly display the moral, social and politi-
cal teachings of the Catholic tradition" Id. See generally The Constitution of Ire-
land, 1937, available at http://193.178.1.117/upload/publications/297.pdf.
38 See Buckley, supra note 36, at 278-79. See also Liam Hamilton, Matters of
Life and Death, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 543-44 (1996) where the Chief Justice of
the five-member Supreme Court of Ireland states:
The authors of our 1937 Constitution, which came into effect on 29 De-
cember 1937, in including a section on fundamental rights, could have had
little idea of the revolutionary impact it would have on Irish society. The
then-Taoiseach [Prime Minister] Mr. de Valera seems to have viewed the
provisions as being mere headlines for the Legislature' - standards for
government to aim at, but not for courts to enforce. Articles Forty
through Forty-four gave express recognition to those rights most prized in
Western liberal democracies - personal liberty, freedom of expression,
equality before the law, ownership of property, and freedom of religious
belief and practice. The social policy of the Catholic Church also made
2002]
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that under a Constitution written in the Catholic natural law
tradition, the right to life of the unborn was a fundamental
right, which although not enumerated in the Constitution was
nonetheless protected by the document's protection of funda-
mental, inalienable personal rights."39
Although the specific question of whether the pre-1983
Constitution protected the life of the unborn 40 was never di-
rectly addressed by the Irish courts,4 1 in McGee v. Attorney Gen-
eral42 ("McGee") the Supreme Court, in dicta, "indicated that
abortion was constitutionally prohibited and that any right to
privacy protected by the Constitution did not encompass a gen-
eral right to an abortion. '43 The McGee Court did, however, rec-
ognize the right to marital privacy as it applies to contraception
as an unenumerated personal right under Article 40.3. of the
Constitution. 44 This case, coupled with the passage of En-
gland's 1967 Abortion Act, making abortion available to Irish
women simply by crossing the Irish Sea to England,45 led to
fears that McGee would be to Ireland what Griswold v. Connect-
itself felt, in the form of provisions recognising the Family as 'the natural
primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institu-
tion possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and su-
perior to all positive law.'
39 Buckley, supra note 36, at 279 n.21.
40 Article 40.3. of the Irish Constitution, prior to the 1983 Amendment stated:
The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by
its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. The
State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best as it may from unjust
attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, [person, good
name, and property rights] of every citizen.
KINGSTON, supra note 10, at 2.
41 Abortion was and remains a crime under Section 58 and 59 of the Offences
Against the Person Act, 1861. See supra note 11 reprinting the text of Section 58.
42 [1974] I.R. 284 (Ir. S.C.) [hereinafter McGee].
43 KINGSTON, supra note 10, at 2.
44 See id. See supra note 40 for the text of Article 40.3. of the Irish Constitu-
tion, prior to the 1983 Amendment.
45 See Abigail-Mary E.W. Sterling, Note, The European Union and Abortion
Tourism: Liberalizing Ireland's Abortion Law, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 385,
388 (1997). England's 1967 Abortion Act made abortion prior to viability lawful
"when two doctors certified that the baby would be born with a serious handicap,
or if the pregnancy would pose a greater risk to the health or life of the mother or
any of her born children than an abortion would pose." Id. at 388 n.20.
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icut 46 was to America, 47 namely, a precedential foundation for
a future abortion rights case akin to Roe v. Wade.48
Despite clear judicial warnings in McGee and subsequent
cases 49 that the right of marital privacy did not affect the right
46 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The U.S. Supreme Court in Griswold, invalidated a
Connecticut state statute under which a medical director was convicted for giving
"information, instruction and medical advice to married persons regarding means
of preventing contraception." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 351-52 (Kermit F. Hall et al. eds., 1992). The Court held that
"the statute was invalid because it infringed on the constitutionally protected right
to privacy of married persons." Id. This seminal case laid the foundation for Roe v.
Wade in establishing the right to privacy as an unenumerated fundamental right.
Judge Hamilton of the Irish Supreme Court has stated:
A majority of the United States Supreme Court, led by Justice Blackmun,
held that the right to privacy identified in Griswold v. Connecticut ex-
tended to "a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy." Once the Irish Supreme Court had found a right to marital
privacy in McGee, it was feared by some commentators that the Court
might one day extend this right to cover abortions, in the same manner as
Roe v. Wade. In truth, this seemed an unlikely prospect; abortion had
been a statutory offence since 1861, and both popular and judicial opinion
seemed to support this.
Hamilton, supra note 38, at 548 (citations omitted).
47 See Buckley, supra note 36, at 281. See also Paul Ward, Ireland: Abortion:
"X" + "Y" = ?!, 33 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 385, 389 (1995).
48 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
"the right of privacy [which was acknowledged as a fundamental right in Gris-
wald].. .is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 46 at 3.
49 Walsh J. in McGee stated, "any action on the part of either the husband
and the wife or of the State to limit the family sizes by endangering or destroying
human life must necessarily not only be an offense against the common good but
also against the guaranteed personal rights of the human life in question." [1974]
I.R. 284, 312 (Ir. S.C.). Walsh J. expressed similar sentiments in G. v. An Bord
Uchtala, in which he stated:
Not only has the child born out of lawful wedlock the natural right to have
its welfare and health guarded no less well than that of a child born in
lawful wedlock, but a fortiori it has the right to life itself and the right to
be guarded against all threats directed towards its existence whether
before or after birth. The child's natural rights spring primarily from the
natural right of every individual to life, to be reared and educated, to lib-
erty, to work, to rest and recreation, to practice of religion, and to follow
his or her conscience. The right to life necessarily implies the right to be
born, the right to preserve and defend (and to have preserved and de-
fended) that life, and the right to maintain that life at a proper human
standard in matters of food, clothing and habitation. It lies not in the
power of the parent who has the primary natural rights and duties in
respect of the child to exercise them in such a way as intentionally or by
neglect to endanger the health or life of the child or to terminate its exis-
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of the unborn, the anti-abortion movement launched a cam-
paign for a constitutional amendment to guarantee the right to
life of the unborn.50 In September of 1983, the Irish people
voted in favor of a constitutional amendment clearly intended
"to prevent abortion ever occurring in Ireland."51 The vote cre-
ating the Eighth Amendment was carried and is now Article
40.3.3., which reads: "The State acknowledges the right to life of
the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the
mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practi-
cable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right."52 The pas-
sage of the Eighth Amendment set the course for a future
"collision between Irish moral sovereignty and the [ECI. "53
B. Abortion and the Right to Travel Prior to the 1992 Travel
Amendment
Since the Irish Parliament did not pass abortion legislation
after the 1983 Amendment, it was left to the courts to interpret
Article 40.3.3. and to attempt to "vindicate [the right to life of
the unborn] and, where necessary, to reconcile its right to life
with that of the mother."54 The first two cases brought before
the Irish courts after the 1983 Amendment concerned abortion
information and only tangentially touched upon a woman's
right to travel abroad for an abortion. Before and after the 1983
Amendment, "it was widely known that pregnant women with
unwanted pregnancies went to England for abortions" and in-
formation pertaining to abortion services abroad was available
from a variety of sources. 55
tence. The child's natural right to life and all that flows from that right
are independent of any right of the parent as such.
[1980] I.R. 32, 69 (Ir. S.C.).
50 See KINGSTON, supra note 10, at 4. See also Ward, supra note 47, at 390.
51 Ward, supra note 47, at 390. "The total possible electorate was 2,358,651
and of these 1,265,994 voted-481,223 in favour and 416,136 against." Id. at 390
n.44.
52 Art. 40.3.3., Constitution of Ireland, 1937, available at http://193.178.1.117/
upload/publications/297.pdf.
53 MacLean, supra note 14, at 552-53.
54 Carol Coulter, 1983 Amendment Left to Courts, THE IRISH TIMES, Oct. 3,
2001, at 7.
55 Ward, supra note 47, at 390.
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1. First Information Case: SPUC v. Open Door
The first case challenging the Eighth Amendment was
brought by an Irish anti-abortion organization that sought to
enjoin two organizations from providing non-directive abortion
counseling and referrals to abortion providers overseas. In At-
torney General ex rel. The Soc'y for the Prot. of Unborn Children
Ireland Ltd. ("SPUC") v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dub-
lin Well Woman Ctr.,56 SPUC argued that abortion counseling
was prohibited under Article 40.3.3.. The High Court agreed,
ruling that "counseling and assisting of pregnant women to
travel abroad to obtain an abortion was illegal under Article
40.3.3.... [and] that the defendant's activities amounted to a
restrainable activity."57 The ruling was upheld by the Supreme
Court, which found that "giving information about abortion as-
sisted in the ultimate destruction of human life."58 The court
further held "the right to life is absolute and trumps the right to
freedom of expression because there is no implied or unenumer-
ated right to information that could destroy the expressly guar-
anteed right to life of the unborn."59 The Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's claim "that the case implicated ques-
tions of [EC] law and refused to refer the case to the ECJ."6°
The Open Door clinic appealed the case to the European
Commission of Human Rights, arguing, inter alia, that the in-
junction violated Article 10 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
"which advocates freedom of information."61 The Commission
56 [1988] I.R. 593 (Ir. H. Ct.) [hereinafter Open Door].
57 MacLean, supra note 14, at 553. See also Open Door, [1988] I.R. 593 at 617
(Ir. H. Ct.).
58 Sterling, supra note 45, at 389. See also Open Door, [1988] I.R. 618, 624 (Ir.
S.C.).
59 Sterling, supra note 45, at 389. See also Open Door, [1988] I.R. 618 at 625
(Jr. S.C.).
60 Sterling, supra note 45, at 389. Chief Justice Finlay found, "[slince no
claim is made on behalf of the defendants that [assistance to a pregnant woman to
travel abroad and obtain the service of abortion] is a corollary right to whatever
rights such woman may have under the Treaty [of Rome], it follows that no ques-
tion of the interpretation of the Treaty fails to be decided in this case." Id. at 289
n.30 (citing [1988] I.R. 618 at 626).
61 Id. at 390. Article 10 (Freedom of Expression) of the European Convention
on Human Rights provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall in-
clude freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
20021
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ruled in favor of the clinics and held in its report that the in-
junction breached the freedom of expression of Article 10.62 The
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broad-
casting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230 [hereinafter CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS] (emphasis added). In addition to asserting that the injunctions
violated Article 10 of the Convention on Human Rights, the clinic also argued that
the injunctions violated Article 8 (the right to privacy) and Article 14 (the right to
Equal Protection of the laws). Ultimately, the Commission decided the case on the
Article 10 claim.
Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary for
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
Id. art. 8, at 230 (emphasis added).
Article 14 provides:
The enjoyment of rights of freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any such ground such as sex, race, col-
our, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or status.
Id. art. 14, at 232 (emphasis added).
62 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
was signed by Member States of the Council of Europe in 1950, and established
two bodies, the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR). See G. Diane Lee, Comment, Ireland's Constitutional
Protection of The Unborn: Is it in Danger? 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 413, 423
(2000) (citing Inter-Departmental Working Group on Abortion, Gov't of Ir., GREEN
PAPER ON ABORTION (Sept. 1999) 22, available at http://193.178.1.117/upload/publi-
cations/251.pdf). "These two bodies have recently been replaced by a new ECHR,
and decisions of the new court will also be legally binding on the parties." Id. at
423 n.78. Under the old regime, "a citizen of a Member State [could] bring a com-
plaint to the European Commission of Human Rights, a mediating body, for deter-
mining whether there has been a violation of the European Convention of Human
Rights." Id. at 423 (citing Gerry Whyte, Abortion and the Law, 42 DOCTRINE AND
LIFE 253, 261 (1992)). A Commission decision could further be "referred to the
European Court of Human Rights within three months for an authoritative deci-
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Commission determined that Open Door's activities were not
expressly prevented by the terms of Article 40.3.3. because the
Amendment was "insufficiently precise" to give notice to the
clinics that their activities were unlawful.63 Further, the Com-
mission found that the injunction "went beyond what was nec-
essary in a democratic society."64
However, the Commission's analysis was rejected by the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"),65 which found that
"the injunction served the Irish government's legitimate aim of
protecting the rights of the unborn which are guaranteed in Ire-
land's Constitution."66 Although the ECHR acknowledged that
"national authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in
matters of morals" and that "State authorities are, in principle,
in a better position than the international judge to give an opin-
ion on the exact content of the requirements of morals as well as
on the 'necessity' of a 'restriction' or 'penalty' intended to meet
them,"67 it nevertheless found a breach of Article 10. The
ECHR found the injunction disproportionate to Ireland's legiti-
mate aim of protecting the unborn. 68 This ruling was based, in
sion on whether a violation has occurred." Id. (citing Whyte, at 255 n.4). The
ECHR can award compensation, and although its judgments are not binding on
Irish courts, "the government is, however, supposed to remedy any legislation that
violates the European Convention on Human Rights." Id. at 423 n.83 (citing PAUL
O'HIGGINS, INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY: ITS IMPACT ON IRISH LEGAL PRACTICE, IN
LAW & SOCIAL POLICY, SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS IN IRISH LAW 15 (William Duncan
ed., 1987)). See Open Door Counselling v. Ireland, App. No. 14234/88 & 14235/88,
14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 115 (1991) (Commission report) [hereinafter Open Door Eur.
Comm. HR].
63 See Open Door Eur. Comm. HR, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 137.
64 Lee, supra note 61, at 423 (citing Whyte, at 255). See also Open Door Eur.
Comm. HR, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 141-44 (Schermers, H.G., concurring). It is note-
worthy that "other Eur. Comm'n H.R. members found this analysis weak and al-
though he concurred with the majority, Mr. Schermers' opinion clearly supports
the right of a Member State to protect the unborn." Lee, supra note 61, at 423.
65 See Open Door Counselling v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992)
[hereinafter Open Door ECHR].
66 Lee, supra note 61, at 424. Specifically, the Court stated, "it is evident that
the protection afforded under Irish law to the right to life of the unborn is based on
profound moral values concerning the nature of life which were reflected in the
stance of the majority of the Irish people against abortion as expressed in the 1983
referendum. The restriction thus pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of
morals of which the protection in Ireland of the right to life of the unborn is one
aspect." Open Door ECHR, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27 (internal citation omitted).
67 Open Door ECHR, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 29.
68 See id. at 32.
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part, on the Court's observation of the "absolute" and "perpet-
ual" nature of the injunction coupled with the reality of large
numbers of women traveling to England who were "already re-
ceiving information on abortion services outside Ireland."69
This case appears to hold that the Convention "allows a
[M] ember [S]tate to legislate an abortion ban when deemed nec-
essary to protect morals, and it allows information and travel
for abortion purposes to be banned provided the ban is applied
proportionately. " 70
2. Second Information Case: SPUC v. Grogan
While SPUC v. Open Door was pending at the European
Court of Human Rights, SPUC brought another case before the
Irish courts seeking to enjoin three student unions from distrib-
uting student handbooks containing information on abortion
clinics in the United Kingdom. In Soc'y for the Prot. of Unborn
Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan ("Grogan"),71 the student un-
ions were accused of violating Article 40.3.3..72 The defendants
asserted that they had a "legal-economic right to information
about services available in other Member States under [Articles
59 and 60, currently Articles 49 and 50] of the Treaty of Rome
[and] that there is a right to disseminate such information
69 Lee, supra note 61, at 424. See also Open Door ECHR, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
30. The ECHR stated:
It has not been seriously contested by the Government that information
concerning abortion facilities abroad can be obtained from other sources
in Ireland such as magazines and telephone directories or by persons with
contacts in Great Britain. Accordingly, information that the injunction
sought to restrict was already available elsewhere although in a manner
which was not supervised by qualified personnel and thus less protective
of women's health. Furthermore, the injunction appears to have been
largely ineffective in protecting the right to life of the unborn since it did
not prevent large numbers of Irish women from continuing to obtain abor-
tions in Great Britain.
Id. at 31 (internal citation omitted).
70 Lee, supra note 61, at 424-25.
71 [1989] I.R. 753 (Ir. H. Ct.) [hereinafter Grogan].
72 See MacLean, supra note 14, at 554. "The absence of state action is not a
problem in Irish constitutional law: 'If one citizen has a right under the Constitu-
tion there exists a correlative duty on the part of the other citizens to respect that
right and not interfere with it."' DIARMUID RoSSA PHELAN, REVOLT OR REVOLUTION
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 375 n.20 (1997)
(quoting Educ. Co. of Ireland v. Fitzpatrick [1960] I.R. 368 (Budd J., Ir. H.Ct)).
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under [the European Union] . ... -73 The High Court agreed
with the defendants' argument that the right to travel to avail
oneself of services in other Member States must include the
right to receive information about these services. 74 The court,
however, referred to the ECJ 75 the question of whether the
right to receive information gave rise to the right to distribute
information under EC law.76 The ECJ held that although abor-
73 Sterling, supra note 45, at 390. The Treaty of Amsterdam adopted number-
ing changes to the EC Treaty and the Maastricht Treaty [Treaty on European
Union]. This comment uses the numbering adopted by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
For an explanation of these numbering changes, see The Amsterdam Treaty: a
Comprehensive Guide, EUROPA, at http:I/europa.eu.int/scadplus/printversion/en/
lvb/a10000.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
74 See Grogan, [19891 I.R. 753 at 758.
75 The European Court of Justice is the "supreme court of EU law." Lee,
supra note 61, at 425. "The EU (formerly the European Community) includes the
Member States of Austria, Sweden, Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom
(Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and the Republic of Ireland." Id. at 425 n.103.
For a list of current EU Member States, see The Member States of the European
Union at http://europa.eu.intlabc/eumembers/index-en.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2002). See also supra note 32 for a discussion of the Irish Referendum on the
Treaty of Nice and likely expansion of the EC.
76 See MacLean, supra note 14, at 553-54. The High Court has the authority
to refer questions to the ECJ that may involve interpretive issues of EC law under
Article 234 of the EC Treaty. See id. at 554. Article 234 provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity and of the ECB;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the'Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340)
173, art. 234 (1997) (as amended by the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM) [hereinafter EC
TREATY]. The High Court, referred the following three questions under Article
234:
1. Does the organized activity or process of carrying out an abortion or the
medical termination of pregnancy come within the definition of "services"
provided for in Article 60 [currently Article 50] of the Treaty [Eistab-
lishing the European Economic Community?
2. In the absence of any measures providing for the approximation of the
laws of Member States concerning the organized activity or process of car-
rying out an abortion or the medical termination of pregnancy, can a
Member State prohibit the distribution of specific information about the
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tion was considered a "service" under Article 59 [currently Arti-
cle 49],77 the EC Treaty did not cover the students' activities
because the student organizations had "no affiliation with the
providers of the abortion services."78 By limiting its ruling to
what amounts to an economic nexus analysis, the ECJ evaded
answering the substantive and politically charged questions
presented to them.79
Declaring abortion a service under Article 60 [currently Ar-
ticle 50] established that laws regulating access to abortion are
not governed exclusively by Irish law, but may be subject to EC
law if the appropriate economic ties are established. This case
appears to hold that an information provider who can show an
economic nexus between itself and an abortion provider would
be covered under EC law.80
identity, location and means of communication with a specified clinic or
clinics in another Member State where abortions are performed?
3. Is there a right at Community law in a person in Member State A to
distribute specific information about the identity, location and means of
communication with a specified clinic or clinics in Member State B where
abortions are performed, where the provision of abortion is prohibited
under both the Constitution and the criminal law of Member State A but
is lawful under certain conditions in Member State B?
Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v. Grogan, 1991
E.C.R. 1-4733, 4736-37, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, 856 (1990) [hereinafter Grogan
ECJI.
77 See Grogan ECJ, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-4739, 3 C.M.L.R. at 850. Article 59 [cur-
rently Article 49] of the EC Treaty provides as follows:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on free-
dom to provide services within the Community shall be progressively
abolished during the transitional period in respect of nationals of Member
States who are established in a State of the Community other than that of
the person for whom the services are intended. The Council may, acting
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, extend the
provisions of this Chapter to nationals of a third country who provide ser-
vices and who are established within the Community.
EC TREATY art. 59 [currently article 49].
78 Buckley, supra note 36, at 284. See Grogan ECJ, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-4739, 3
C.M.L.R. at 850.
79 See Buckley, supra note 36, at 285-86. See supra note 76, listing the three
questions certified to the ECJ from the High Court. See generally MacLean, supra
note 14 for an excellent discussion of the ECJ's avoidance of substantive issues
concerning Ireland and abortion. MacLean characterizes the ECJ, in Grogan, as
dodging the first direct conflict between EC law and Irish abortion law. See id. at
554. See also KINGSTON, supra note 10, at 37-51; Stoffregen, supra note 11, at 557.
80 Although the ECJ failed to rule in the students' favor, the Court rejected
Ireland's argument that the injunction was permitted as a public policy exception
under Article 56 [currently Article 46], which reads in pertinent part, "The provi-
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3. Protocol No. 17 to the Maastricht Treaty
After Grogan, but prior to the X Case (discussed below), Ire-
land was in a political dilemma. By declaring abortion an eco-
nomic service, the ECJ laid the foundation for "ECJ case law
[being used] to override Article 40.3.3., where the economic ties
referred to in Grogan were present .. ". ."81 Ireland found its
opportunity to counter this possibility in December of 1991,
when the EC Member States replaced the Treaty of Rome with
the Maastricht Treaty.8 2 "[T]he government of Ireland sought a
provision to the Maastricht Treaty that would preclude EU law
[from] overturning Ireland's constitutional protection of the un-
born." 3 Ireland insisted on annexing Protocol No.17 to the
Maastricht Treaty, which provides as follows:
sions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice
the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative ac-
tion providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public pol-
icy, public security or public health." EC TREATY art. 56 [currently art. 461. Thus
the ECJ's ruling demonstrates that the public policy exception in Article 56 [cur-
rently Article 46] will not be broadly construed. The ECJ's decision in Grogan has
been described as "the low water mark of the Court's regard for national constitu-
tional law." PHELAN, supra note 72, at 379.
Grogan established the possibility of using Article 59 [currently Article
49] (EC) as a sword against a constitutional right .... Despite ruling the
moral issue to be irrelevant, the [ECJI in... Grogan adopted an approach
with enormous moral implications by recharacterisation of the rights in
issue, based on economic principle which denies the validity of the Irish
constitutional position in the European Community. By defining abortion
as an economic activity in European Community law the Court has placed
abortion under the Article 2 (EC) task to promote throughout the Commu-
nity a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities.
Id. at 381. This criticism is based on a historical survey of the ECJ's evolving
jurisprudence and interpretation of fundamental rights. See generally id. at 371-
400.
81 MacLean, supra note 14, at 559.
82 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 145 (as amended by the
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM) [hereinafter MAASTRICHT TREATY].
83 Lee, supra note 61, at 427. "Protocol No. 17 to the Treaty on European
Union was adopted to avoid the possibility of Community law overriding Article
40.3.30 of the Constitution should a conflict arise between this constitutional pro-
vision and Community law." Inter-Departmental Working Group on Abortion,
Gov't of Ir., GREEN PAPER ON ABORTION (Sept. 1999) 25 [hereinafter GREEN PAPER]
(The GREEN PAPER is an official government report on abortion in Ireland. The
text was decided by an Irish Cabinet Committee (established by the Government of
Ireland) and the preparatory work was carried out by an Interdepartmental Work-
ing Group), available at http://193.178.1.117/upload/publications/251.pdf. "This
Protocol created in essence a form of automatic derogation whereby European
Community law would not apply to Irish abortion issues, for by its instructions the
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The High Contracting Parties have agreed upon the following pro-
vision, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union
and to the Treaties establishing the European Communities:
Nothing in the Treaty on European Union, or in the Treaties es-
tablishing the European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts
modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the appli-
cation in Ireland of Article 40.3.3. of the Constitution of Ireland.
8 4
Protocol No. 17 "directs the European Court of Justice to
defer to Irish law in so far as there may be a conflict between
Community law and the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3.
of the Constitution." 5 The Maastricht Treaty was signed on
February 7, 1992, but not yet ratified, when Ireland was con-
fronted with what has been described as "one of the most impor-
tant constitutional cases to come before an Irish court
and. . .one of the most widely debated and analysed cases in
Irish legal history." 6
4. The X Case
The first case requiring Irish courts to directly consider the
conflict between the right to life of the mother against that of
the fetus pursuant to Article 40.3.3.87 was Attorney General v. X
ECJ could no longer supersede Irish law on matters relating to abortion." Anne M.
Hilbert, Note, The Irish Abortion Debate: Substantive Rights and Affecting Com-
merce Jurisprudential Models, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1151 (1994).
84 PROTOCOL ANNEXED TO THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND TO TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES [Regarding Ireland], Feb. 7, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 247 at 362 [hereinafter MAASTRICHT TREATY Protocol 171 (emphasis added).
"The issue of travel had not yet risen directly in litigation at the time of the adop-
tion of the Protocol, other than in relation to assistance in making travel arrange-
ments in [SPUC v. Open Door] .... " KINGSTON, supra note 10, at 163.
85 KINGSTON, supra note 10, at 164-65. It has been stated that an additional
intent of the Protocol was to assure the political backing of the anti-abortion
groups for the Maastricht Treaty referendum. See MacLean, supra note 14, at 559.
86 KINGSTON, supra note 10, at 6.
87 The issue of lawfulness in this context was addressed in dicta in Attorney
General (S.P.U.C.) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., [19881 I.L. 593 (Ir. H. Ct.),
where Hamilton P. stated:
that the right to the life of the unborn was a natural law right recognised
and protected by the Constitution prior to the Eighth Amendment. How-
ever, he stated later in that case that he was not looking at the issue of
how the right to life of the unborn might be regarded in view of the equal
right to life of the pregnant woman.
KINGSTON, supra note 10, at 6 (citing [1988] I.L. 593 at 597, 617).
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and Others ("X Case").88 This case took place in February of
1992, when the High Court granted the Attorney General's re-
quest for an injunction prohibiting a fourteen-year old rape vic-
tim (who was subsequently declared by the court to be suicidal
because of the rape and resulting pregnancy) from having an
abortion or from traveling to England for an abortion.
Presumably, such injunctions were not regularly sought as
common sense dictates that pregnant women traveling to En-
gland for abortions would not ordinarily bring their intentions
to the attention of legal authorities. However, in the X Case,
the victim's parents contacted the Irish police8 9 inquiring about
proper collection of DNA evidence for the prosecution of the al-
leged rapist. The Director of Public Prosecutions was consulted
and the case was referred to the Attorney General who then pe-
titioned for the injunction.90 The High Court granted the in-
junction, directly balancing the rights of the unborn against
that of the mother: "IT]he risk that the defendant may take her
own life if an order is made is much less and is of a different
order of magnitude than the certainty that the life of the unborn
will be terminated if the order is not made."91 However, the
High Court's decision was reversed by the Supreme Court
which held that "[If it is established as a matter of probability
that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct
from the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the
termination of her pregnancy, such a termination is permissi-
88 [1992] 1 I.R. l(Ir. H. Ct.) [hereinafter X Case].
89 An Garda Sioch6na.
90 The Inter-Departmental Working Group on Abortion, Gov't of Ireland
stated:
Both the girl and her parents wished to travel abroad so that she could
have an abortion. The issue of having scientific tests carried out on re-
trieved foetal tissue so as to determine paternity was raised with An
Garda Siochdna. The Director of Public Prosecutions was consulted and
in turn informed the Attorney General. An injunction was obtained ad
interim to restrain the girl from leaving the jurisdiction or from arranging
or carrying out a termination of the pregnancy.
GREEN PAPER, supra note 83, at 16. For criticism of the High Court decision and
discussion of the legal effect of interim orders upon defendants outside the jurisdic-
tion, see Ward, supra note 47, at 403.
91 X Case, [1992] 1 I.R. at 12 (Ir. H. Ct.). See also MacLean, supra note 14, at
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ble, having regard to the true interpretation of Article 40[.3.3.1
of the Constitution."92
Thus, the major difference in the reasoning between the
High Court and the Supreme Court was the latter court's "clas-
sification of suicide as a qualifying medical risk to the life of the
mother under the Eighth Amendment."93 Because X had estab-
lished to the court's satisfaction that she was suicidal, under
the forgoing rationale, she was permitted to have an abortion.
It is worth noting that the issue in this case was whether X
could obtain an abortion in Ireland, not whether she had a right
to travel to obtain one.94 In dicta, however, three of the five
Supreme Court Justices made the controversial suggestion that
"the right to travel could be restricted in favor of the right to life
of the unborn."95
Chief Justice Finlay, Justice Egan, and Justice Hederman (who
alone dissented on the substantive issue) were of [the] opinion
that the right to travel was not absolute, and could not simpliciter
take precedence over the right to life: This meant that injunctions
restraining travel abroad to procure abortions could be justified. 96
Justice O'Flaherty and Justice McCarthy did not agree with
such restrictions on travel.
The former thought it would interfere to an unwarranted degree
with the individual's freedom of movement and with family au-
thority; the latter felt that the court had no jurisdiction to curtail
the right to travel on the basis of an intention, even if that inten-
tion were to commit a crime in another jurisdiction.97
What is striking about both the High Court and the Su-
preme Court decisions in the X Case is the near total silence
regarding the implication of EC law. 98 Both Irish courts appar-
92 X Case, [1992] 1 I.R. at 53-54 (Ir. S.C.).
93 Buckley, supra note 36, at 286.
94 See id. at 288. Although the distinct scope of the X case is legally signifi-
cant, in practical terms it is arguably irrelevant. The obvious lack of skilled abor-
tion practitioners in Ireland would seem to require women who met the X case
"suicide standard" to travel to England for the abortion procedure.
95 Id.
96 Hamilton, supra note 38, at 555-56.
97 Id. at 556.
98 See MacLean, supra note 14, at 558. "The Supreme Court in X grounded its
reasoning exclusively in Irish constitutional law, placing no reliance upon Euro-
pean Community legal principles." Hilbert, supra note 83, at 1143. The High
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ently felt that their handling of the case was "sufficient to dis-
pose of... what [was] considered... 'the substantive issue' in
the case."99
As stated above, the X Case focused on the right to legal
abortion in Ireland, and did not directly address the right to
travel to obtain an abortion. But even so, the logical implication
of this case is that a woman did not have a right to travel to
have an abortion in the absence of a real and substantial risk to
her life. 100 While the merits of the travel implication estab-
lished in the X Case are not considered in this comment, it
should be noted that the widely publicized fact that "an esti-
mated 100 Irish women travel to England each week for abor-
tions,"1° 1 surely would suggest that such a standard would be
judicially unmanageable.
5. The Solemn Declaration
As noted earlier, the X Case was decided before the Maas-
tricht Treaty (containing Protocol 17) was put before the Irish
people for ratification. "Because of the [Irish] public's senti-
ment . . . [after the X Case], ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty which required a Constitutional Amendment, and thus
the vote of the people, was jeopardized."0 2
Court, however, did acknowledge the "fundamental right to travel to procure ser-
vices for all EEC citizens . .. [but noted] that there is also a public policy deroga-
tion that could be invoked by a Member State to prohibit such travel." Rachel A.
Yorke, Tiocfiadh Ar La: Ireland's Struggle With Abortion, 5 NEW. ENG. INT'L &
COMp. L. ANN. 83, 94 (1999). Some commentators believe that the X Case could
have easily been referred to the ECJ under Articles 49 and 50, and the ECJ could
have found Ireland's law contrary or inconsistent with these Articles. See id.
99 Hamilton, supra note 38, at 555. See also MacLean, supra note 14, at 558.
By basing its decision exclusively in Irish law, the Irish courts were not obligated
to petition the ECJ with questions regarding the impact of EC law in the case. If
such advice was sought from the ECJ, final resolution of the case might have been
delayed by as much as eighteen months. See Gerry Whyte, Abortion and the Law,
42 DOCTRINE AND LIFE 253, 257 n.8 (1992).
100 See Buckley, supra note 36, at 288.
101 Denis Fitzgerald, Voters' Heavy Burden 49 WORLD PRESS REVIEw 4 (Spring
2002), http://www.worldpress.org/europe/0402eire.htm. See also Irish Family Plan-
ning Association, Irish Abortion Statistics at http://www.ifpa.ie/campaigns/abor-
tion/iabst.html (last visited Dec. 3. 2002) ("Between January 1980 and December
1999, at least 85,559 Irish women had abortions in Britain.").
102 Lee, supra note 61, at 427. The X Case ruling "caused world-wide outrage
and protests. 'Demonstrators took to the streets of Dublin with signs that read
'Rapists 1- Women 0,' 'Human Rights for Rape Victims,' and 'Ireland Defends
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The result of the X Case was disturbing to both the anti-
abortion and pro-choice groups and both launched campaigns
against ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 10 3 Fearing the
Irish people would not ratify the treaty and after the Prime
Minister's unsuccessful attempt to amend Protocol 17,104 "Ire-
land's only resort was to sign a Solemn Declaration"10 5 to the
Maastricht Treaty:
The High Contracting Parties to the Treaty on European Union
signed at Maastricht on the seventh day of February 1992,
Having considered the terms of Protocol No 17 to the said Treaty
on European Union which is annexed to that Treaty and to the
Treaties establishing the European Communities,
Hereby give the following legal interpretation:
That it was and is their intention that the Protocol shall not limit
freedom to travel between Member States or, in accordance with
conditions which may be laid down, in conformity with Commu-
nity law, by Irish legislation, to obtain or make available in Ire-
Men's Right to Procreate by Rape.' A poll taken showed two-to-one support for
modifying the Eighth Amendment to allow abortion under some circumstances."
Yorke, supra note 97, at 94 (citing Stoffregen, supra note 11, at 543 and Natalie
Klashtorny, Ireland's Abortion Law: An Abuse of International Law, 10 TEMP. INT'L
& COMp. L.J. 419, 428 (1996)). See supra text accompanying note 85 for a detailed
discussion of the X Case.
103 See MacLean, supra note 14, at 559. After the X Case, anti-abortion groups
were concerned about the latitude given to the right to the mother's life (i.e., that
suicide was a valid threat to the life of the mother). See Whyte, supra note 98, at
257-58. Additionally, the anti-abortion movement was concerned that allowing
abortion within Ireland "contravened the will of the people as expressed in the
1983 referendum." JAMEs CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 437 (3d ed.
2000). Casey remarks that this later concern is hard to reconcile as "in 1983 the
people had voted for a text clearly recognising the potential for conflict between the
rights to life of the mother and the foetus . . . ." Id. at 437 n.109. On the other
hand, the pro-choice movement was concerned that ratification of the Protocol
would interfere with the freedom to travel abroad for an abortion where no threat
to the mother's life was present. See Whyte, supra note 98, at 257-58.
104 On April 6, 1992, Prime Minister Reynolds
traveled to Luxembourg in hope of getting the European Community part-
ners to change the anti-abortion protocol by adding a phrase guaranteeing
the right to travel and to abortion information. After expressing sympa-
thy for Ireland's predicament, an 8-4 majority voted against reopening the
Treaty to avoid setting a precedent leading to further requests which
could undermine the Treaty.
Jeffrey A. Weinstein "An Irish Solution To An Irish Problem": Ireland's Struggle
With Abortion Law, 10 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 165, 195 (1993).
105 MacLean, supra note 14, at 560.
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land information relating to services lawfully available in
Member States. 10 6
At the same time the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare
that, in the event of a future constitutional amendment in Ireland
which concerns the subject matter of Article 40.3.3. of the Consti-
tution of Ireland and which does not conflict with the intention of
the High Contracting Parties hereinbefore expressed, they will,
following the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, be
favourably disposed to amending the said Protocol so as to extend
its application to such constitutional amendment if Ireland so
requests. 107
Although questions remain as to the legal effect of the Dec-
laration, s08 "it was enough, along with the economic benefits' 0 9
and a promise of an abortion referendum," 0 to secure ratifica-
106 It appears that this language may have been inserted to address the Irish
public's outrage after the X Case. See supra note 102, discussing the post-X Case
reaction. That the Declaration states, "it was and is the intention" is perplexing in
light of the clear contrary intention of Protocol 17. See HOGAN & WHELAN, IRELAND
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY TEXTS AND COMMEN-
TARY 148-51 (1995) for a discussion of the legal effect of the seemingly contradic-
tory intentions of the Declaration and the Protocol.
107 DECLARATION OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON EURO-
PEAN UNION, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 109. This section could have arguably been added
as a concession to the anti-abortion movement, which anticipated a future consti-
tutional amendment further restricting abortion. Indeed, such an amendment was
proposed in 2001. See infra note 177 for a discussion of the Protection of Human
Life in Pregnancy Bill 2001.
108 See KINGSTON, supra note 10, at 170-76 for an in-depth discussion of the
legality of the Declaration. "The Solemn Declaration did not appear to be legally
binding on the ECJ, nor to serve as anything more than an interpretive guide for
the courts. It did not convince anyone that the Protocol was not intended to dero-
gate from the free circulation and freedom to provide services." Sterling, supra
note 45, at 396. "The prevailing view is that the Declaration is not legally binding.
In all likelihood, the Declaration is nothing more than a statement of political in-
tent." Buckley, supra note 36, at 290. See also HOGAN & WHELAN, supra note 106,
at 143-54.
109 "Since its membership began in 1973 Ireland increased its level of prosper-
ity due to increased trade and Community subsidies to the poorer countries. The
government projected that the union would bring Ireland approximately $10 bil-
lion over the next five years." Weinstein, supra note 104, at 195.
110 After Prime Minister Reynolds returned home from his unsuccessful at-
tempt to change Protocol 17, he "announced that a referendum would be held later
in the year. He stated that a further amendment to the Constitution was the most
likely way of protecting the right of Irish women to travel to other European Com-
munity states and to be given information on abortion services outside of Ireland."
Weinstein, supra note 104, at 195.
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tion of the [Maastricht Treaty] by the Irish people on June 18,
1992."111
C. The 1992 Travel Amendment to the Irish Constitution
Responding to the X Case and fearing that the ECJ would
rule against Irish law, the Irish people passed two constitu-
tional amendments which by all appearances guaranteed a wo-
man's right to abortion information and her corresponding right
to travel abroad to get an abortion. 112 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Irish Constitution reaffirms the right to freedom of
information: "This subsection [Article 40.3.3.] shall not limit
freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to
such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relat-
ing to services lawfully available in another state."113 What is
now the Thirteenth Amendment of the Irish Constitution pro-
tects the right to travel: "This subsection [Article 40.3.3.] shall
not limit freedom to travel between the State and another
state."1 4 Some had thought that the Travel Amendment had
111 MacLean, supra note 14, at 560. "The Maastricht Treaty was approved [in
June of 1992] by 69 percent of Irish voters." Weinstein, supra note 104, at 195.
112 "Following the vote, Irish politicians promised to introduce legislation con-
cerning permissible abortions in circumstances such as rape, incest, and the risk of
suicide." Buckley, supra note 36, at 290. To date no such legislation has been
passed. See WORKERS SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT, Abortion Referendum Victory in Ire-
land, Mar. 8, 2002, available at http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/wsmnews/2002/
refvictoryMARCH.html.
113 Art. 40.3.3., Constitution of Ireland, 1937, available at http://193.178.1.117/
upload/publications/297.pdf.
Subsequent to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
[1]egislation was introduced in the form of the Regulation of Information
(Services outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act, 1995
which laid down in law, as contemplated by the recent 'information'
amendment of the Constitution, conditions under which information re-
lating to services lawfully available in another State might be made avail-
able within the State. This Act permits a doctor or advice agency to
provide abortion information to pregnant women in the context of full
counselling as to all available options and without any advocacy of abor-
tion. Abortion referral is specifically prohibited under the Act. This legis-
lation was referred to the Supreme Court by the President and its
constitutionality was upheld.
GREEN PAPER, supra note 83, at 19. See also infra note 130 for a summary of the
pertinent sections of this Act. See, Regulation of Information (Services Outside the
State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act, 1995, available at http://www.ifpa.ie/
download/InfoAct.pdf.
114 Art. 40.3.3., Constitution of Ireland, 1937, available at http://193.178.1.117/
upload/publications/297.pdf (emphasis added).
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"provid[ed] that the right to life of the unborn could not be in-
voked to prevent anyone exercising their freedom to travel
"'115
It was generally believed that with the passage of the
Travel Amendment, Ireland "fell in line with ECJ proclama-
tions" and thus successfully averted a future clash with EC
law. 116 Indeed a plain reading of the Amendment would appear
to support the conclusion that the Irish courts lost their power
to enjoin women from traveling abroad to have an abortion. On
the other hand, the wording of the statute, in particular the lim-
iting phrase of "this subsection [Article 40.3.3.]," could be inter-
preted to mean that "rights arising from constitutional
provisions other than [Alrticle 40.3.3. might be invoked to re-
strain a non-suicidal pregnant woman from travelling outside
the State to have an abortion. 11 7 It appears that the Irish
courts have not entirely lost their power to enjoin travel as it
relates to abortion. As the 1997 C Case illustrates, the Irish
courts will consider the rights of the parents of a minor child, in
determining whether to enjoin or fund travel for an abortion.
D. The C Case
The first and, to date, only post-Travel Amendment abor-
tion case brought before the Irish courts was A and B v. E.
Health Bd. ("C Case").18 This case involved a thirteen-year-old
pregnant rape victim who was in the care of the state-run East-
ern Health Board ("EHB"). The EHB petitioned the High Court
for permission to take the girl to England for an abortion, but
her father opposed the petition. 119 The High Court held that
the EHB was permitted to take C to England for an abortion
because, as in the X Case, the girl was considered suicidal and
therefore a real and substantial risk to her life existed if the
115 Ivana Bacik, Abortion - Time for Change, IRISH COUNCIL FOR CiIL LIBER-
TIES, Nov. 1998, available at http://www.iol.ie/-iccl/feb981.htm.
116 See MacLean, supra note 14, at 560.
117 CASEY, supra note 103, at 443.
118 [1998] 1 I.L.RM. 460 (Ir. H. Ct.) [hereinafter C Case].
119 The girl's father was an Irish Traveller. "Irish Travellers are an indigenous
minority with a distinctive lifestyle and culture based on a nomadic tradition."
Buckley, supra note 36, at n.5. For more information on Irish Traveller's, see
Pavee Point Culture, at http://www.paveepoint.ie/pav-culturea.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2002).
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pregnancy were to continue. 120 Although the case did not di-
rectly implicate the Travel Amendment, 12 1 Justice Geoghegan,
writing for the court, nevertheless, addressed it:
[The Travel Amendment] is framed in negative terms and must,
in my view, be interpreted in the historical context in which it was
inserted. There was, I think, a widespread feeling in the country
that a repetition of the [X Case] should not occur in that nobody
should be injuncted from actually travelling out of the country for
the purpose of an abortion. It must be remembered that three out
of the five judges of the Supreme Court took the view that in an
appropriate case a travel injunction could be granted. It was in
that context, therefore that the amendment was made and I do
not think it was ever intended to give some new substantial right.
Rather, it was intended to prevent injunctions against travel or
having an abortion abroad. A court of law, in considering the wel-
fare of an Irish child in Ireland and considering whether on health
grounds a termination of pregnancy was necessary, must, I be-
lieve, be confined to considering the grounds for termination
which would be lawful under the Irish Constitution and cannot
make a direction authorising travel to another jurisdiction for a
different kind of abortion. The amended Constitution does not
now confer a right to abortion outside of Ireland. It merely pre-
vents injunctions against travelling for that purpose. 122
Justice Geoghegan's statements leave many questions un-
answered regarding the scope of the Travel Amendment. 123 For
120 The finding of a suicide as a qualifier to legal abortion is rather curious
considering that suicide is absolutely prohibited by the Roman Catholic Church.
Such a finding seems to be in direct contradiction of the natural law tradition of
Ireland. "[Ilt seems likely that what the X and C cases really sought was a rape
exception to the right to life of the unborn." Buckley, supra note 36, at 306.
121 The Travel Amendment issue "was not one on which [Justice Goeghegan]
... addressed either by counsel for the State or for the Health Board." GREEN
PAPER, supra note 83, at 20.
122 C Case, [1998] 1 I.R. at 478 (Ir. H. Ct.) (emphasis added).
123 See Buckley, supra note 36, at 304-5 for an interesting discussion of the
consequences of the C Case and the unanswered questions regarding state funded
abortions.
It is clear from the C case decision that as the law currently stands, any
child in the care of a health board who is pregnant and suicidal is entitled
to have an abortion funded by the Irish State... [w]hat is unclear is what
would happen to a young, pregnant, suicidal girl whose parents would not
allow her to have an abortion. If the risk is considered 'real and substan-
tial' and her parents refuse to let her have an abortion, are there grounds
for her being put into state care? Certainly if the child's life is considered
[Vol. 14:385
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example, if the court had found that the girl in C was not sui-
cidal, the existing remedy presumably would have been to en-
join the EHB from taking her to England for an abortion. The
distinction between a "freedom to travel" and a "right to travel"
is far from clear. The High Court has stated that the Travel
Amendment does not create a substantive right to travel to
have an abortion and that the Travel Amendment should be
viewed within the context of the social response to the X Case.
Apparently it remains an open issue concerning upon whom the
Amendment confers these freedoms. For example, does a mi-
nor, suicidal or not, in the face of parental objection have an
independent "freedom to travel" under the Amendment? The
High Court seems to imply that, at least when faced with paren-
tal objection of a minor's traveling abroad for an abortion, "pro-
ceedings could be issued[,] for example under the Guardianship
of Infants Act, 1964... and that in these circumstances a court
should determine the issue by reference to the right to life of the
unborn guaranteed in Article 40.3.3. and not by reference to the
constitutional freedom to travel. '124
Perhaps it is better stated that currently the Travel
Amendment provides a "qualified freedom" to travel to another
country for an abortion. While the wording of the Travel
Amendment may be clear as it relates to Article 40.3.3., this
case seems to say that when the court is petitioned for permis-
sion to take a minor outside of Ireland for an abortion, it will
look to the interests of third parties (such as parents) and bal-
ance the right to life of the minor with the right to life of the
at risk by an Irish court, it would be grounds for her being put into care,
per Section" 18(1) of the Child Care Act.
Id.
The Irish government has stated that Justice Geoghegan's remarks in the C Case
"are problematic":
The logical implication is that proceedings could be issued, for example
under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, in a case in which parents
are in dispute with their minor daughter over whether she should travel
for an abortion (or the parents themselves disagree on this issue) and that
in these circumstances a Court should determine the issue by reference to
the right to life of the unborn guaranteed in Article 40.3.3. and not by
reference to the constitutional freedom to travel. It may be argued in the
alternative that in such a case the freedom to travel should determine the
issue.
GREEN PAPER, supra note 83, at 20.
124 GREEN PAPER, supra note 83, at 20.
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unborn. A logical corollary to this case, and a yet unanswered
question is whether a biological father has standing to petition
the court for a travel injunction. A fair reading of the C Case
would seem to permit such an application and would mark a
substantial qualification to the Travel Amendment.
E. Summary of Current Irish Abortion Law
The current state of Irish abortion law can be summarized
as follows: Abortion in Ireland is illegal under the Irish Consti-
tution, unless a substantial risk to the life of the mother is pre-
sent; the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State
for Termination of Pregnancies) Act, 1995 defines the legal pa-
rameters for providing information on abortion services abroad;
and "in general, women can travel abroad for an abortion."125
III. WOMEN ON WAVES: A FAILED TEST CASE?
At first glance, any freedom of choice advocate would be in-
trigued by the creativity of Women on Waves. Indeed when
viewed within the historical context of Irish abortion law, this
activism takes on an impressive level of sophistication. Consid-
ering the backlash that Ireland felt surrounding the X Case126
and the uncertainty of future ECJ decisions regarding Irish
abortion law, it is hard to imagine that the Irish government
would enter this arena again without considerable misgivings.
But when faced with the brazen nature of Women on Waves,
and the inevitable public discourse from the anti-abortion
movement, the Irish authorities could be forced to address the
issue.
Under these circumstances, seeking to enjoin its nationals
from obtaining abortions in international waters could arguably
be the least restrictive method of addressing the issue. 127 Al-
125 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
126 See supra note 102 for a discussion of the post-X reaction. See also supra
note 85-98 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the X Case.
127 This comment is limited to the discussion of enjoining Irish nationals and
does not address the issue of potential criminal charges being brought against
Irish nationals upon return to shore from receiving abortions in international wa-
ters. The unpredictability of the imposition of criminal sanctions was one of the
main concerns voiced by the Women on Waves organization. "Gomperts worries
that women who have received shipboard abortions might face legal sanctions
from their own countries. In fact, the island of Malta and its Catholic bishops were
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lowing an "abortion boat" to dock in its port, pick up its citizens,
and travel twelve miles from its shore to provide abortions
infuriated, claiming, 'We are ready to prosecute any person that colludes or col-
laborates with the doctor.'" Judith LaPook, Women on Waves' to Provide Offshore
Abortions Abroad, WESTCHESTER COALITION FOR LEGAL ABORTION, available at
http://www.wcla.org/00-summer/waves.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2002). Ireland
did not publicly threaten its nationals with potential criminal sanctions. As indi-
cated earlier in this comment, Ireland does criminalize abortion, but such prosecu-
tion is not commonly exercised. "There is some evidence of... prosecutions under
the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, in particular during the mid-1940s,
when wartime restrictions on travel between Ireland and England were imposed.
No prosecution under the Act has taken place since 1974." GREEN PAPER, supra
note 83, at 17. Further, it is doubtful that Ireland would prosecute women upon
return to Ireland especially inter alia, in light of the international condemnation of
such German practice.
Some German authorities adopted a different tack under the former West
German abortion law, seeking to impose domestic criminal penalties on
women for obtaining abortions in more permissive countries. German
border guards forced gynecological examinations upon women reentering
Germany at the Dutch border in the search for evidence of extraterritorial
abortions, while prosecutors brought criminal charges against German
women upon their return from abortions obtained in other European
countries with more permissive laws.
Kreimer, supra note 34, at 458. See id. at 458 n.23 for an excellent discussion and
a wealth of citations (reprinted below) on the German inspection and prosecution
of its returning nationals: See Debates, 1991 O.J. (Annex 3-403) 202-05 (Mar. 14,
1991) (Debates of European Parliament) (debate on resolutions condemning com-
pulsory gynecological examinations by German officials of returning German wo-
men at the Dutch-German border); id. at 203 (statement of Rep. Van Den Brink)
('over 6000 German women have had ... abortion[s] in the Netherlands'); id. at
204 (statement of Rep. Keppehoff-Wiechert) (defending searches on the ground
that officials 'are required by the code of criminal procedure to investigate illegal
abortions of this kind carried out abroad where there are grounds for suspecting
that such has been committed. . .'). See also Karen Y. Crabbs, The German Abor-
tion Debate: Stumbling Block to Unity, 6 FLA. J. INT'L L. 213, 222-23 n.103 (1991)
(account of prosecutions, searches, and examinations of returning German wo-
men); Nina Bernstein, Germany Still Divided on Abortion, Newsday, March 11,
1991 (providing account of German woman returning from Netherlands who was
forced to submit to vaginal examination at Catholic hospital near border and
charged with illegal abortion; noting that study by Max Planck Institute finds that
such 'inquisitions' are 'standard practice'). The European Parliament condemned
the searches and resolved that 'the internal borders of the European Community
may not be used to threaten citizens with prosecution for activities that are per-
fectly legal in some Members States but not in others.' Resolution on Compulsory
Gynecological Examinations at the Dutch-German Border of March 14, 1991, 1991
O.J. (C 106) 113.
For an in-depth analysis of abortion and Irish criminal law, see generally M.J.
Findlay, Criminal Liability for Complicity in Abortions Committed Outside Ire-
land, 15 IR. JURIST 88 (1980). Note that the Findlay article may be moot due to the
passage of the Travel Amendment. See KINGSTON, supra note 10, at 53 n.3. See
also id. at 52-78 for a discussion of abortion and Irish criminal law.
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would seemingly make a mockery of Ireland's current "out of
sight, out of mind" abortion philosophy. 128 There can be little
doubt that Women on Waves can reasonably be viewed as an
intolerable insult, if not an outright threat, to Ireland's moral
sovereignty. 129
Although it is impossible to predict the Irish government's
response to Women on Waves or the variety of legal defenses
that would be asserted had Women on Waves been successful,
below are four potential test case scenarios:
(1) If the High Court upon petition of the Attorney General, en-
joined its nationals from boarding the Aurora, the Supreme
Court and/or the ECJ would undoubtedly be presented with a
claim that such a restriction violates both the Travel Amend-
ment and EC law. This scenario in essence would continue the
direction suggested by the X Case by having the issue of travel
restriction directly reviewed by the courts of the EC.
(2) Even if the High Court denied the Attorney General's peti-
tion for an injunction, the C Case appears to hold that certain
third parties may have an independent constitutional right to
petition for an injunction. Therefore, if parents of a minor child
or a biological father were to petition the court for an injunction,
the court would presumably balance the right to life of the
mother against the right to life of the unborn. If an injunction
was ordered, the pregnant woman could rightly appeal arguing
that such an injunction violates her constitutional "freedom" or
"right" under the Travel Amendment and violates her freedom
of movement under the EC Treaty.
128 "Mr Joe Higgins (Socialist Party, Dublin West) said it would be more honest
if the Taoiseach presented each woman with a crisis pregnancy with a map of En-
gland, and, perhaps, a ferry ticket, because the Government did not want to know
anything about them and preferred to shut their eyes to their predicament."
Michael O'Regan, Taoiseach Says Abortion Poll Has No European Dimension, THE
IRISH TIMES, Oct.10, 2001, at 7.
129 Dr. Gomperts has recognized the brazen nature of her activism.
Gomperts acknowledges that her project 'is a shocking idea.' But she de-
fends it as 'an emergency solution to a shocking reality. We can circum-
vent national laws like this, but that is not the main purpose,' she insists.
'The main purpose is to offer a much-needed service and to draw attention
to what is happening. Twenty million of the 53 million abortions per-
formed each year around the world are illegal and often unsafe', Gomperts
points out, and '100,000 women die each year during such illegal
operations.'
Ford, supra note 8.
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(3) If the Irish authorities were to prosecute Women on Waves
Ireland for violating the Regulation of Information (Services
outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act, 1995
("Information Act"), 130 the ECJ could be forced to review
whether this legislation and for that matter, the Fourteenth
Amendment, are compatible with EC law. It appears that Wo-
men on Waves Ireland may be in violation of this legislation in
that its published language on its web page could be viewed as
impermissibly advocating abortion. 131
(4) Finally, the possibility exists that Women on Waves Ireland
could be viewed as having the required Grogan "economic
nexus" with Women on Waves. As discussed earlier, Women on
Waves Ireland describes itself as "the partner organization in
130 See supra note 113 for a discussion of the Regulation of Information (Ser-
vices Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act, 1995. Casey summa-
rizes the pertinent sections of this Act as:
The 1995 Act closely regulates the provision of information about abortion
services abroad. Section 4 prohibits the display of public advertisements,
and the distribution of unsolicited publications, containing such informa-
tion. Under section 5 those providing information must not advocate or
promote the termination of the pregnancy, and they must advise the wo-
man of all of the courses of action open to her. Section 6 prohibits any
economic links between the information-giver and those providing abor-
tion services outside the State, while section 7 decrees that the informa-
tion-giver may not receive financial or other benefits by reason of
supplying the information. Nor may the information-giver make an
appointment or any other arrangements on the woman's behalf with the
foreign provider of services: section 8. Finally, section 13 specifically
recognises conscientious objections to the provision of relevant infor-
mation.
CASEY, supra note 103, at 443. See also HoGAN & WHELAN, supra note 106, at 144
(acknowledging the potential point of conflict in Act's prohibition of economic links
between information-givers and abortion providers in other Member States). See
Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of
Pregnancies) Act, 1995, available at http://www.ifpa.ie/download/InfoAct.pdf.
131 Women on Waves Ireland states on its web page: "By educating the public
about the social and medical issues concerning unwanted pregnancy and the need
for access to safe, legal abortion services, Women on Waves Ireland will catalyze
efforts to liberalize abortion laws in Ireland." About Women on Waves in Ireland,
supra note 16. Additionally, "[tihis is part of a wider campaign to get the law
changed so that we no longer have to send more than 6,300 women to Britain every
year to have abortions. And there are many other women in Ireland who are not
able to take up this option." "Morning After Pill" For Whoever Needs It, at http//
www.womenonwaves.net/ireland/news/leafmorn after.html (last visited Oct. 13,
2002) (emphasis added).
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Ireland to the Women on Waves Foundation." 132 If this "eco-
nomic nexus" is established, Women on Waves Ireland's activi-
ties would be permissible under EC law but at the same time
would violate Section 6 of the Information Act, which prohibits
such a nexus.
The Aurora's presence off the coast of Ireland coupled with
the Open Door and Grogan rulings provides fertile ground for
the EC courts to directly address the conflicts between Irish and
EC law. For abortion rights activists who want to hurry the
liberalization of Irish abortion law, the EC courts might appear
to be a promising venue. However, this comment asserts that
political considerations should cause the ECJ to steer away
from an attempt to reconcile any existing legal incompatability
between EC and Irish law under these set of facts. The high
degree of moral sovereignty implicit in abortion, public policy
and the goal of overall political harmony of the Member States
of the EC dictates that Ireland should be allowed to exercise the
reasonable response of enjoinment.
IV. ENJOINING ABORTION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND THE
TRAVEL AMENDMENT
The Irish courts, to date, have not directly addressed the
Travel Amendment and how it relates to Article 40.3.3.. The
lack of case law interpreting the Travel Amendment and abor-
tion gives the Irish courts a certain amount of flexibility ena-
bling them to justify injunctions in this unique setting.
The courts could distinguish between traveling into inter-
national waters for abortions and traveling to England or other
Member States for abortions on several grounds. "[E]ven
though the [Travel] Amendment specifically states that it will
not interfere with an individual's freedom to travel to another
state ... [tihe words of the Amendment would seem to protect
only against the overbroad restriction on any pregnant woman
from traveling. ."..",133 Injunctions in this case would be strictly
limited to traveling for abortions in international waters, thus
enabling Ireland to address this situation.
132 About Women on Waves in Ireland, supra note 16. This issue is beyond the
scope of this article.
133 MacLean, supra note 14, at 564 (emphasis added).
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It is certainly within the court's power to interpret the
plain meaning of the Amendment to preclude an interpretation
that a Dutch registered vessel is "another state" within the con-
text of the Amendment. Support for such an interpretation can
be found in Justice Geoghegan's obiter dicta in the C Case, that
the Travel Amendment must "be interpreted in the historical
context in which it was inserted. ,134 As the Travel Amendment
was passed in direct response to the X Case,135 the court could
limit the scope of the Amendment in this instance because trav-
eling into international waters for an abortion was simply not a
part of the historical context in which the Amendment was
passed. Additionally, Justice Geoghegan's statements in the C
Case that "[t]he amended Constitution does not now confer a
right to abortion outside of Ireland ... [i]t merely prevents in-
junctions against travelling for that purpose,"136 can similarly
be limited to the only historical context that Ireland has ever
known with regard to abortion tourism - on land. Further-
more, the court could find an injunction justified on public
health grounds, in light of health risks associated with ob-
taining an abortion on the rough waters of the Irish Sea. 137
134 C Case, [1998] 1 I.R. at 478 (Ir. H. Ct.) (emphasis added). The pertinent
part of Mr. Justice Geoghegan's opinion may also be found in GREEN PAPER, supra
note 83, at 20.
135 "The Thirteenth Amendment concerns potential restrictions on travel aris-
ing from remarks by three judges in Attorney General v. X." KINGSTON, supra note
10, at 180. In fact, because of the political dilemma that existed after the X Case,
but before the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, then Prime Minister Reynolds
stated that a constitutional amendment would be the most likely way of protecting
the right of Irish women to travel to other states within the EC. See MacLean,
supra note 14, at 559 n.275.
136 C Case, [1998] 1 I.R. at 478 (Ir. H. Ct.).
137 "Anyone who has crossed the Irish Sea knows it's no duck pond. A haircut,
dental cleaning, even applying mascara could be hazardous in its frequent rough
swells . . . but surgery!" Wills, supra note 22. The difficulties of providing abor-
tions on the open seas was acknowledged by Women on Waves Ireland. "[W]eather
conditions and other factors may lead to difficulties in travelling outside territorial
waters on any given day." Press Release, Women on Waves Ireland, Women on
Waves Ireland Asks Women Not to Cancel Counselling Appointments (June 14,
2002), at http://www.womenonwaves.net/ireland/news/pr no-cancel.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 13, 2002).
While the ship will have a fully equipped clinic with facilities for safe
abortions, it is not envisaged that surgical abortions will be carried out on
the ship when it visits Ireland because of the availability of land-based
legal abortion in Britain. All activities on board the ship will have wo-
men's health as their absolute priority, and will be completely lawful.
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That the Irish court could justify enjoining women from
traveling into international waters for an abortion under Irish
law does not end the analysis. As stated earlier, it would seem
that the passage of the Travel Amendment harmonized Irish
and EC law regarding the right to travel. But even before the C
Case demonstrated the existence of a possible exception, it was
clear that:
[t]he provisions of the Thirteenth... Amendment... do not give a
right to abortion or termination of pregnancy where none existed
prior to their enactment. Thus, Ireland is still 'within the realm
of the derogations from the fundamental.., freedoms' guaranteed
by Articles 49 and 50 of the EC Treaty, and, despite the evasive
maneuvering and the constitutional amendments, the potential
for conflict still exists between EC law and Article 40.3.3..138
It is apparent that if Ireland enjoined women in this context, it
would be forced to address how such a finding is compatible
with its obligations under EC law.
V. ENJOINING ABORTION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND THE
APPLICATION OF PROTOCOL No. 17
Although Ireland attached the Declaration to the Maas-
tricht Treaty, stating its intention not to interfere with the free-
dom to travel, the Declaration can reasonably be viewed as a
statement of intent, arguably with no binding effect. 139 Even
so, these circumstances require broader analysis than simply
relying on Protocol No.17, which requires the ECJ to defer to
Irish law when a conflict between EC law and Article 40.3.3.
Press Release, Women on Waves Ireland, Women on Waves Ship Comes to Ireland
(May 30, 2001), at http://www.womenonwaves.net/ireland/news/Pr_about-june30.
html.
138 MacLean, supra note 14, at 560 (emphasis added).
139 Leading scholars have stated:
A declaration is a unilateral statement of policy or opinion that, like an
understanding, is not intended to alter or limit any provision of the treaty.
It is considered to have the least effect on the original treaty text and is
used primarily to articulate a signatory's purpose, position, or expecta-
tion, concerning the treaty in question.
BURNS H. WESTON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw AND WORLD ORDER 93 (3rd ed.
1997). See also supra note 108 for a brief discussion and further sources relating
to the legality of the Declaration. See supra note 107 and accompanying text, re-
printing the relevant portion of the Declaration.
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arises. 140 The Protocol nullifies EC law as it relates to the ap-
plication of Article 40.3.3. in Ireland. Whether Ireland may
successfully invoke Protocol No.17 in this circumstance depends
on whether the ECJ finds the proposed injunctions to be an ap-
plication of 40.3.3. in Ireland as the language of the Protocol
states. 141
This language warrants a brief analysis. Travel injunc-
tions in this case may be interpreted either as an application of
40.3.3. in Ireland, affording Ireland the protection of Protocol
No. 17, or conversely, may be interpreted as having extra-terri-
torial implications, thus removing the Protocol's protection from
ECJ review.
Sound arguments can be made for either interpretation.
One argument for finding travel injunctions to be an application
of 40.3.3. in Ireland is made by distinguishing between two
types of injunctions: (1) those aimed at preventing nationals
who are still in Ireland from leaving the jurisdiction, and (2)
injunctions aimed at nationals who have already left Ireland.1 42
The latter type of injunction would obviously not be an applica-
tion of 40.3.3. in Ireland but rather an attempt to apply 40.3.3.
extra-territorially, and as such would not be afforded the pro-
tections of the Protocol. But Protocol No. 17 probably would ap-
140 See supra note 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Protocol 17. As
Protocol 17 was adopted prior to the Travel Amendment, an issue remains as to
whether Protocol 17 applies to the Travel Amendment at all.
In relation to possible amendment of Article [40.3.3.1, the Protocol would
seem not to restrict the power to amend the Article, as it seeks only to
exclude Community law from affecting the application in Ireland of this
constitutional provision. Any amendment would therefore be a matter for
domestic law. However, the question has been raised whether an amend-
ment would automatically obtain the benefit of the immunity from Com-
munity law provided by the Protocol. This is because it is unclear from the
wording of the Protocol whether the Article [40.3.3.1 referred to in the Pro-
tocol is that which existed at the time of ratification of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union [Maastricht Treaty] or could include any later amendment of
it. On the one hand, legal certainty would seem to require that our Com-
munity partners should only be bound by that version of Article [40.3.3.1
which existed at the time of the ratification of the Treaty. On the other
hand, it could be argued that the intention of the Protocol was to leave
these matters entirely to Irish constitutional law and that therefore any
later changes to Article [40.3.3.] are covered by the Protocol.
GREEN PAPER, supra note 83, at 25 (emphasis added).
141 See HOGAN & WHELAN, supra note 106, at 146.
142 See id. at 147.
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ply to the former type of injunction as it is directed at Irish
women within Ireland and "since [this] injunction would not be
extra-territorial in either its operation or effect .... 143
One argument for finding travel injunctions outside the
protection of the Protocol is that an injunction which seeks to
control the exit of nationals is specifically designed to prevent
an activity that is legal in other Member States, and therefore
the very nature and effect of the injunction is not limited to an
application of 40.3.3. in Ireland.144 Because of the ambiguity of
the language of Protocol No. 17, the ECJ would, in all likeli-
hood, have to address the argument that enjoining travel is a
derogation of the right to avail oneself of services and freedom
of movement of persons conferred by Articles 59 and 60 [cur-
rently Articles 49 and 50].
VI. ENJOINING ABORTION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS:
F n5.1LI~ntlLJ. i Gii TI'JN OFr XJUI~RiliEN %.. .jV111LNii I.LJ.MVV
It is necessary to define Ireland's obligations under EC law
before assessing whether an injunction would run counter to
these obligations. 145 The ECJ relies on the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights ("Eur.Conv.HR") as a source of commu-
nity rights. This reliance was reaffirmed in the Maastricht
Treaty. 146 "Article F(2) [currently Article 6(2)] of the Treaty
provides that the Union shall respect the fundamental rights,
inter alia, as guaranteed by the [Eur.Conv.HR], as general prin-
ciples of Community Law."14 7 The ECJ has defined general
principles of community law as "customary rules, derived from
the Member States' common legal heritage," that have "evolved
from continental administrative law standards and certain fun-
damental rights."148 Further, the ECJ is not limited to drawing
inspiration from the Eur.Conv.HR, but can look to the "constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States."1 49 "These
143 Id. at 147-48 (internal quotations omitted).
144 See id. at 147.
145 See GREEN PAPER, supra note 83, at 22.
146 See id.
147 Id.
148 MacLean, supra note 14, at 539.
149 Id. For a brief history of the sources of ECJ law, see The Amsterdam
Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide, EUROPA, at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/printver-
sion/en/lvb/a10000.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002). As there is no commonality of
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'fundamental rights' include 'human rights,' and are typically
more political and social, rather than economic, in nature. The
ECJ expressly stated that the EC cannot accept measures
which are incompatible with observance of the human rights
recognized and guaranteed by the [Eur.Conv.HR] ."150
A collection of articles in the EC Treaty are said to estab-
lish the four freedoms which the ECJ must ensure: "the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital across Mem-
ber States' borders. ' 151 In addition to the four freedoms, Article
59 [currently Article 49] of the EC Treaty requires the elimina-
tion of discrimination against member service providers and
prohibits "any restriction ... when it is liable to prohibit or oth-
erwise impede the activities of a provider of services established
in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar
services." 152
A cursory reading of the articles outlined above, coupled
with Ireland's stated intent of not restricting travel between
Member States in its Declaration to the Maastricht Treaty' 53
could lead to the conclusion that any travel injunctions pertain-
ing to abortion would be contrary to established EC law as there
is a fundamental freedom for individuals of Member States to
travel to avail themselves of member services.
However, an extraordinarily important public policy excep-
tion in the EC Treaty is essential to this discussion. "Under Ar-
ticle 46 and Article 55 of the EC Treaty, Member States may
enact regulations that restrict the fundamental freedoms
granted under Articles 49 and 50 on the 'grounds of public pol-
constitutional traditions relating to abortion between the Member States, presum-
ably the ECJ would be limited to relying on the Eur.Conv.HR as a source of funda-
mental rights in this situation. Further, the probable expansion of the EC in 2004
will further solidify the non-commonality of Member State traditions relating to
abortion as seven of the ten applicant countries have restrictions or bans on abor-
tion. See Frydryh, supra note 32. See generally supra note 32, discussing the Irish
Referendum on the Treaty of Nice and likely expansion of the EU.
150 MacLean, supra note 14, at 539-40.
151 Id. at 540. "Articles 43 through 48 guarantee that citizens of Member
States cannot be restricted on freedom of establishment, and Articles 49 through
55 guarantee the freedom to provide services." Id.
152 Id. at 541 (citing Case C-76/90, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4221, 1-4243, [1993] 3
C.M.L.R. 639 (1991)). See supra note 77 for the text of Article 59 [currently Article
49].
153 See supra, note 108 for a brief discussion of the questionable binding effect
of the Declaration.
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icy, public security and public health."' 154 The condition to this
exception is that "[t]he freedom to provide services can only be
limited by rules which are justified by 'overriding reasons relat-
ing to the public interest.' These requirements must be 'neces-
sary' and must not exceed what is necessary to attain those
objectives." 155 Ireland should be able to successfully invoke the
public policy exception to curtail offshore abortions.
Ireland could argue that Women on Waves is a political or-
ganization as opposed to a medical services organization and
that it is attempting to use international waters as a jurisdic-
tional mask to circumvent Irish abortion law and as such
should not be considered a "service provider" within the context
of EC law. Alternatively, the injunctions are a permissive dero-
gation of EC law under the public policy exception of Articles 46
and 55 of the EC Treaty. 156
A. Women on Waves is not a "Legitimate" Service Provider
Argument
The ECJ's holding of abortion as a service in Grogan,
"transformed cross-border access to abortion into an economic
right protected by the EEC Treaty." 57 Articles 59 and 60 [cur-
rently Articles 49 and 50] guarantee the freedom to provide ser-
vices, but the ECJ in Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del
Tesoro158 ("Luisi") "extended the reach of these articles . . . to
protect the freedom both to receive services and to travel to an-
other Member State to receive services." 59 Therefore, the Irish
abortion issue "[can] no longer be characterized purely as a mat-
154 MacLean, supra note 14, at 541-42. See generally PHELAN, supra note 72,
at 392-400 (criticizing the ECJ for its interpretation of derogations based on the
public policy exception).
155 MacLean, supra note 14, at 542 (quoting Case C-353/89, Comm'n v. Nether-
lands, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4069, 1-4093-94 (1991)).
156 The ECJ
maintains significant power over how much deviation from European
Community law Member States will be allowed in pursuing their public
policies. Recognizing the threat to equality of access presented by deroga-
tion, the ECJ has construed the concept of'public policy' grounds strictly,
requiring a showing of a 'genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting
one of the fundamental interests of society.'
Hilbert, supra note 83, at 1151-52.
157 Hilbert, supra note 83, at 1150.
158 Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, 1984 E.C.R. 377, 1985 3 C.M.L.R. 54 (1984).
159 Hilbert, supra note 83, at 1145.
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ter of substantive individual rights under Irish law; now abor-
tion had been cast as a 'service' within the web of European
Community commercial relations."160
Accordingly, the ECJ should examine the following ques-
tions, which arise from this situation: does the non-economic in-
tent of political activism and the manner in which a Member
State purports to provide a service alter the analysis as to who
is a legitimate service provider? These questions are separate
from questions of morality and indeed may be broader in scope
than the public policy exception allows. Arguably, the ECJ
would have to address the political question of whether it views
Women on Waves as subverting EC law by masking itself as a
legitimate service provider and seeking the sanction of EC law
for political purposes. 161 Such an inquiry is not unprecedented,
as the ECJ in Luisi, "indicated a willingness to examine chal-
lenged activities to determine if they fit the concept of 'service'
under Articles 59 and 60 [currently Articles 49 and 50] and, if
so, to extend the status of protected economic rights to such ac-
tivities."I62 Although the ECJ, in Grogan, declared abortion to
be a "service," nothing precludes the court from examining the
manner in which this service is provided and the underlying
motives of the service provider. Under these articles, the ECJ
might decline to regard Women on Waves as a "legitimate" ser-
vice provider because a finding to the contrary would under-
mine the political unity objectives of the EC states.
B. Public Policy Exception Argument
As noted above, Articles 46 and 55 of the EC Treaty permit
Member States to enact restrictions that limit the fundamental
freedoms granted under Articles 49 and 50 on the grounds of
public policy, public security and public health. This exception
appears to provide for Member State independence within cer-
tain areas of governance. "The import of this exception is that
160 Id. at 1150.
161 "This is guerrilla activism, the feminist version of fighting logging policies
by hijacking a tree. Gomperts hopes that by skirting nations' abortion laws, she
will ultimately overturn them. 'I want these countries to change their laws,' she
explains. 'The only way to get the law changed is to push the issue.'" Thornton,
supra note 8.
162 Hilbert, supra note 83, at 1145-46.
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the domestic law of a Member State may trump European Com-
munity law if it meets the requisite proportionality test."163
Therefore, if a Member State asserts valid public policy
grounds for its domestic regulations, even if those regulations
affect transborder access to services, it may be beyond the juris-
dictional reach of the ECJ.164 The public policy exception does
not, however, exempt domestic regulation from ECJ review.
"Recognizing the threat to equality of access presented by dero-
gation, the ECJ has construed the concept of 'public policy'
grounds strictly, requiring a showing of a 'genuine and suffi-
ciently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests
of society."' 165
In rebutting the argument that Ireland's actions violate EC
law, Ireland would have to show: (1) that enjoining nationals
from obtaining abortions in international waters relies "on im-
perative requirements of public interest"; (2) that enjoining na-
tionals from obtaining abortions in international waters "is
consistent or not incompatible with the aims laid down in the
Treaty provisions"; and (3) that enjoining nationals from ob-
taining abortions in international waters "passes the propor-
tionality test."166
1. A Travel Injunction Relies on Imperative Requirements of
Public Interest
Consistent throughout Ireland's evolving abortion law is
the majority view that abortion is morally wrong and will be
permitted in Ireland only when there is a real and substantial
risk to the life of the mother. Moreover, the protection of the
life of the unborn is a constitutional requirement that super-
cedes the majority's moral conviction. "[Tihe Irish constitutional
provision against abortion is not based on the question of moral-
ity but is based on the right of the individual life."' 67 When
presented with a threat to a constitutionally protected right,
163 Id. at 1151.
164 See id.
165 Id. at 1151-52 (quoting Case 30/77, Regina v. Pierre Bouchereau, 1977
E.C.R. 1999, 2014; 2 C.M.L.R. 800, 825 (1977)).
166 MacLean, supra note 14, at 562.
167 PHELAN, supra note 72, at 400 n.127 (quoting Brian Walsh, Reflections on
the Effects of Membership of the European Communities in Irish Law in (1987) C-
D. EHLERMAN, ET AL., Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION (1989)).
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Ireland has an affirmative constitutional obligation to counter
this threat. 168
Ireland should not be prevented from aggressively con-
fronting a perceived threat to the public interest. The opinion of
Advocate General Gulmann in Her Majesty's Customs and Ex-
cise v. Schindler ("Schindler")169 is applicable to this case:
"[S]trong grounds can be put forward for holding that national
rules which contain a general prohibition of a specified activity
and which are neither overtly or covertly discriminatory are not
incompatible with Article 59 [currently Article 49] of the
Treaty."170
In Schindler, the ECJ found England's legislation restrict-
ing Member State importation of advertisements and lottery
tickets to be a permissive derogation of EC law based on the
public policy exception. Through Schindler, the ECJ estab-
lished that Member States may protect themselves from per-
ceived threats to public policy. The considerations that the ECJ
concluded were valid included preemptive restrictions relating
to crime prevention, and "to avoid stimulating demand.., for a
service which has damaging social consequences. "171
Implicit in this ruling is the validity of the restriction's fo-
cus being on the consumers as well as the maintenance of order
in society.' 72 Accordingly, Ireland could argue that the injunc-
tions are permissively directed at their nationals who are "con-
sumers" of the service of abortion and that Women on Waves is
facilitating a stimulation of a service that is counter to their
public policy.' 73 Certainly, Women on Waves could reasonably
168 Indeed, Justices Findlay and Hederman, in the X Case, "stated clearly that
the Attorney [General] had not been merely entitled, but bound to institute the
relevant proceedings." CASEY, supra note, 103 at 437 n.110. On the other hand,
prosecutorial discretion is a recognized legal principle in Ireland.
169 Case C-275/92, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1039, 1995 1 C.M.L.R. 4 (1994) [hereinafter
Schindler].
170 MacLean, supra note 14, at 563 (quoting Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. at 1-1060,
[1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 24 (opinion of Advocate General Gulmann)).
171 Id. at 567.
172 See id.
173 Women on Waves stated that one of their goals was to service those women
who could not afford the travel fare to England to have an abortion. "[Liarge num-
bers of Irish women continue to require abortion services and the double burden of
coping with a crisis pregnancy and the trip to England particularly affects low-
income women." Women on Waves Ireland Asks Women Not to Cancel Counsel-
ling Appointments, supra note 137.
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be seen as a perceived threat to Ireland's public policy, and as
such, Ireland would be entitled to protect itself against this
threat.
2. A Travel Injunction is not Incompatible with the Aims of
the European Community Treaty
Having established that there is an imperative require-
ment of public interest, Ireland must prove that this restriction
outweighs the freedom of movement. "[T]he ECJ has held that
the fundamental freedoms are strong, but rebuttable, presump-
tions."174 Ireland would argue that the injunction is aimed at
protecting the right to life of the unborn, which is a fundamen-
tal right under the Irish Constitution while the right to an abor-
tion is not.175
The aim of the Maastricht Treaty was the furtherance of
political and economic unity among the Member States. When
considering whether an injunction preventing offshore abortion
is consistent with the aims of the Treaty, the ECJ, regardless of
whether it finds injunctions to be protected under Protocol No.
17, cannot ignore its existence.
It must be remembered that Protocol No. 17 was inserted
into the Maastricht Treaty in direct response to the ECJ hold-
ing abortion to be a service in Grogan. Collective recognition of
the nationalistic quality of abortion regulation was apparent in
the Member States' agreement to the insertion of the Protocol.
One Member State targeting a fellow Member State with the
express intent of forcing a change in its laws would seem to con-
flict with the spirit of the Treaty and can reasonably be seen as
a direct threat to these goals. Injunctions intended to thwart
offshore abortions should be seen as a justified and appropriate
counter to a perceived threat that directly involves a subject
matter that the Member States have previously acknowledged
is within Ireland's exclusive sphere of governance.
3. A Travel Injunction Passes the Proportionality Test
The principle of proportionality is "employed to ensure that
the restriction is necessary and the national rule does not have
174 MacLean, supra note 14, at 565.
175 See id. at 566.
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any effects beyond what is necessary."'1 76 Unlike the injunction
in Open Door, which was found disproportionate by the ECHR,
injunctions in this instance would not be perpetual or broad.
This injunction would presumably be limited to the specific pe-
riods when the Women on Waves vessel was in Irish ports and
travel to England or other Member States for abortions would
still be permitted.
Use of injunctions, in this case, avoids the more problem-
atic scenarios that might arise from other state action, such as
impounding the ship or imposing criminal sanctions upon re-
turning nationals and/or those who aid in their travel. With the
acceptance of the principle that Ireland can act to protect itself
against perceived threats to constitutionally protected rights,
injunctions used in this preemptive manner would indeed ap-
pear to be the least restrictive means by which Ireland could
meet its legitimate public policy goals.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ireland did not have to respond to Women on Waves in
2001 because the organization failed to obtain the proper Dutch
abortion licensing. However, had Ireland been forced to re-
spond, it is the position of this comment that it would have been
justified in the measured response of enjoining its nationals
from traveling twelve miles off the coast of Ireland to have abor-
tions. It is unreasonable to expect a nation to sit idle when con-
fronted by a challenge to its constitutional, criminal, moral and
religious codes and beliefs.
Although the future may force the ECJ to compel Irish
abortion law to comply with EC law, such an action will have to
balance delicately Ireland's religious and moral sovereignty
against that of the greater European Community. The ECJ's
acknowledgement that issues of morality are to be determined
by Member States, coupled with its history of evading the politi-
cally charged issue of abortion, dramatically tilt the odds
against diminishing Ireland's moral sovereignty in a case in
which abortion is enabled through the evasive ploy of opera-
tions in international waters. Such a finding would place the
176 Id. at 569.
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ECJ in the politically untenable position of tampering with
highly sensitive moral parameters of a democratic nation.
The people of Ireland are more than capable of liberalizing
their abortion law, and the public outcry after the High Court's
decision in the X Case and subsequent amendments to the Con-
stitution provides strong evidence of this inclination. The criti-
cal question is not whether the law should be liberalized, but
rather, which judicial body should oversee liberalization. Ire-
land has witnessed much healthy debate and movement in this
area of law. Because of the deeply religious, historic, political
and personal aspects of abortion, it is vital that this sophisti-
cated republic sets its own course and defines its own laws.
This wisdom is likely to prevail against the designs of activists
trying to control the outcome of an evolving debate with mo-
mentous importance. 177
177 There was not wholesale support for Women on Waves throughout the
abortion rights community:
Some abortion rights advocates have expressed concern about the plan,
fearing that the ship might create a backlash in some countries against
efforts to legalize abortion. 'The political consequences to women's groups
in the countries where the ship may operate need to be taken into consid-
eration,' said Anika Rahman, director of international programs at the
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy in Washington, D.C.
Joan Lowy, Floating Clinic Would Provide Abortions, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, June
11, 2000. Knowing the power of the Irish pro-life movement, one must question if
the risks of backlash for the Irish abortion rights movement was significantly con-
sidered by Women on Waves. The Irish counterpart to Women on Waves, Women
on Waves Ireland, is comprised of well-respected leaders of the Irish abortion
rights movement and leading Irish abortion law scholars. One would assume that
such an affiliation would have been based on a calculation that the venture could
produce a test case to bring to the ECJ. "[Aifter running afoul of Dutch medical
licensing laws ... the voyage began to look more like a clumsy PR exploit than a
mission of mercy .... Thomas K. Grose, An Abortion Ship on the High Seas, US.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 25, 2001, at 30. Mary Muldowney, a spokesperson
for the ship conceded that "the ship's crew had sailed [with] the knowledge that
they didn't have the necessary papers." Nicola Byrne, Dutch Activists Renege on
Abortions Promise, THE INDEPENDENT (London), June 16, 2001, at 2. Further, Wo-
men on Waves Ireland "were only told an hour before the ship's arrival that no
women would be treated." Jenny Booth, Abortion Boat Admits Dublin Voyage was
a Publicity Sham ... , SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), June 17, 2001, at 10. That the
venture was ended by the failure of Dr. Gomperts to procure the proper Dutch
licensing evidences to this author that the political positioning of the Irish pro-
choice movement was not carefully and intelligently considered by Women on
Waves.
In 2001, Ireland's Minister of Health proposed a bill to the House of the Oi-
reachtas (Irish Parliament) entitled Twenty-fifth Amendment of the Constitution
(Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy) Bill, 2001, available at http:l!
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www.irlgov.ie/bills28/bills/2001/4801/default.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002). One
of the intentions of this bill was to reverse the finding of the X Case - that suicide
could be considered a substantial risk to the life of the mother. The Department of
Health and Services explanation regarding the proposed changes to the Constitu-
tion included:
[tlhe unborn will continue to be protected by Article 40.3.3 of the Consti-
tution. In addition, the Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Act will
contain a specific prohibition on abortion. A threat of self-destruction (i.e.
suicide) on the part of a pregnant woman will not be grounds for terminat-
ing her pregnancy. The Government wants to afford the maximum protec-
tion to the unborn while at the same time ensuring that women in
pregnancy who are suffering from certain life-threatening medical condi-
tions receive all necessary medical treatment.
Press Release, Department of Health and Children, Twenty-fifth Amendment of
the Constitution (Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy) Bill, 2001, Key Ques-
tions, at http://www.doh.ie/publications/propkeyq.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2002)
(emphasis added). See also, Legislative History of Protection of Human Life in
Pregnancy Bill, 2001, Oct. 2001, available at http://www.feargalquinn.ie/2001/
bills/25.htm. On March 7, 2002, the Amendment was defeated "by just 10,500
votes in a ballot which displayed a clear divide between urban and rural areas."
Irish PM Concedes Abortion Defeat, BBC NEWS, Mar. 7, 2002, available at http:fl
news.bbc.co.uk/L/low/world/europe/1859287.stm.
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